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I. INTRODUCTION"

Over three and one half million people, most of them United
States citizens or nationals, reside in the insular territories of the
United States.' Territorial status was- once seen as merely a waystation on the road to statehood, but for American Samoa, Guam,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands it has taken on permanence. At
present, only Puerto Rico is a serious candidate for statehood. In
light of the constitutional requirement of equal representation in the
United States Senate, their disproportionately small size in relationship to most states remains a major obstacle to statehood. 2 Additionally, there is concern in all the territories that statehood might result
in excessive assimilation with the mainland and the destruction of
their unique indigenous cultures.
At the same time, a majority in each territory favors remaining a
part of the United States.' In addition, the Northern Marianas are in
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981 8 (102d
ed.). The total population of the United States territories and the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands as of 1980 was 3,564,839. The total resident population for that year in Puerto Rico was
3,196,520; for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 116,555; for Guam, 105,821; for the
Virgin Islands, 95,591; for American Samoa, 32,395; and for the Northern Marianas, 16,860.
The United States has three other small unorganized territories with populations as of the 1980
census: Midway Island, 468; Johnston Atoll, 327; and Wake Island, 302. Id.
2. See generally e.g., H.R. REP. No. 886, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). During the debates
in Congress over the proposed constitutional amendment to give congressional representation
to the District of Columbia, the size of the District's population in relationship to Senate representation was a much discussed topic. "As for equality of treatment, it must be recognized that
the District of Columbia is no more than a city and then not a particularly large one at that."
Id. at 13 (Minority report of Congressmen Hyde, Moorhead, Brooks, Wiggins and Ashbrook).
During the hearings in the House, Congressman Butler expressed the opinion that the proposed
amendment would have "hard, if not impossible sledding" when the people in the states realize
that it would give the District equivalent voting power. Representation for the District of Columbia: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional and Civil Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977). The Congressman's prediction seems to
have been borne out by the fact that in the first four years after proposal by Congress, only six
states ratified the amendment. NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (lst ed. Supp.
1982). The territories, especially the smaller ones, are well aware of this limitation on their
options. See REPORT FROM THE SECOND FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS COMMISSION TO THE GoVERNOR AND THE FIFTEENTH LEGISLATURE OF AMERICAN SAMOA (1979) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL
STATUS REPORT].

In Puerto Rico, a separatist movement counterbalances support for statehood or other
forms of closer association with the United States. See Clem & Levine, The Consequences of
Status - Notes on Imperial Development in Puerto Rico and Tadzhikistan, 38 REVISTA DEL
COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO 529 (1977). See also Axtmeyer, Non-Self-Governing
Territoriesand the Constitutive Process of the United Nations: A General Analysis and the
Case Study of Puerto Rico, 45 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO Nos. 3-4,
211, 235-53 (1976).
3. In American Samoa, for example, this was the conclusion reached by the Commission
on Future Political Status after two years of public hearings. POLITICAL STATUS REPORT, supra
note 2. The Northern Marianas, formerly a part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
voted four to one in a 1976 plebiscite to become a United States commonwealth. Report of the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss4/4

2

Laughlin: The Burger Court and the United States Territories
U.S. TERRITORIES AND BURGER COURT

1984]

the process of becoming a United States Commonwealth. Moreover,
the Caroline and Marshall Islands, now a part of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, are forming nations that will continue to be
affiliated with the United States as free association states. These
facts suggest the legal and political status of United States territories
is a matter of ongoing importance.
Several reasons explain this preference for continued affiliation
with the United States. First, small societies find having a security
arrangement with a larger power increasingly attractive and more dependable than a mere treaty obligation. 4 Second, being part of a major economic unit has obvious advantages.5 Third, territorial inhabitants, as United States citizens, have an unrestricted right to travel
and settle throughout the United States.' Finally, most territorials
prize their United States citizenship and think of themselves as
7
Americans.
These arguments for continued affiliation are persuasive. The desire to participate as an equal in one's own governance is either an
innate characteristic of human beings or has been so universally enculturated that it has become a force that cannot be denied without
disasterous consequences. To achieve self-government, however, it is
not necessary that every culturally distinct society raise its own flag
and go it alone in the international arena. Recent history demonstrates that formal independence for small societies does not always
yield political or economic well-being.
Conversely, affiliation with a larger unit is not necessarily antithetical to self-government or to substantial economic independence.
The fact a majority of United States territorials wish to remain part
of the Union is evidence that the basic concept of affiliation is worth
pursuing. Recurring problems demonstrate that much work remains
if the relationship is to endure, but the challenge is worth taking. If
the United States can successfully create a system whereby people of
U.N. Visiting Mission, June 1975.
4. The Faldand Islands war is illustrative. Had the Falldands been an independent nation and Britain's obligation one of treaty, would Great Britain have made the same wholehearted and costly effort to liberate them? The experience of the republic of Vanuatu, formerly
the New Hebrides, is an example of an additional threat to small societies. On May 28, 1980, on
the eve of independence, a secessionist insurrection, believed in many quarters to have been
financed by American businessmen, necessitated the return of British and French forces to
restore government control. The new government requested that the British station a battalion
of troops in Vanuatu through the end of the year. 4 NEw PACdIc 10 (Oct. 1980). Thus, these
small island societies with no plausible military capability are vulnerable not only to foreign
sovereigns, but also to privately financed insurgents.
5. See POLrmCAL STATUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
6. See generally 3 C. GORDON & H. ROS.NImLD, IMMGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 17.4
(1980).
7.

See

POLrICAL STATUS

REPORT, supra note 2, at 41-47.
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territories with distinct cultures can participate as equals in our economic political and legal systems without endangering their cultural
uniqueness, America may provide a model for the world's smaller societies for living in harmony in the world community without
exploitation.
The absence of voting representation in the United States Senate
impairs achievement of such a system. This roadblock can and
should be remedied by constitutional amendment.' Yet even if such
action is taken, other political and legal problems must be solved if a
mutually satisfactory relationship is to endure between the territories
and the rest of the United States. At a high level of abstraction, most
territorials have three desired outputs from their government. These
desires are potentially conflicting and the major challenge is to reconcile them in a functional and satisfactory manner. Territorials want:
(a) substantial autonomy in local affairs; (b) preservation of their
traditional cultures; and, (c) the rights and privileges of American
nationality insofar as those rights and privileges are compatible with
(a) and (b).
Congress and the President of the United States play major roles
in shaping the territorial governments. Their performance of these
roles has neither been as good as it could have been nor as bad as one
might have feared. All of the existing territories have substantial
measures of self-government,' some chartered by the Congress and
others by the President. Yet over the years, the Executive Branch
has at times shown insufficient sensitivity to the cultural needs of the
territories. Ultimately, it will be up to the Congress to propose a constitutional amendment that will cure the problem of disenfranchisement and create a fundamentally sound charter for territorial
government.
The courts also play a.key role in shaping the governmental institutions of territories. Ultimately, the courts define the status of the
territories and determine the application of federal law, including the
United States Constitution, within the territories. Territorials are
ambivalent about the role of courts for much the same reasons as are
the residents of the states. While most territorials want judicial protection of their own rights, they sometimes worry about the aggregate
impact of judicial intervention on self-government. As in the states,
8. In proposing the District of Columbia Amendment, see supra note 2, Congress acted on
the assumption that a constitutional amendment was necessary to give congressional representation to an entity other than a state. Cf. Raven-Hensen, Congressional Representationfor the
District of Columbia: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167 (1975) (application
of nominal statehood theory to District of Columbia for representation purposes as an alternative to constitutional amendments).
9. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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individual cases provoke disputes over whether particular decisions
reinforce or impair democratic values.10 There is further concern that
the application of legal norms developed on the mainland may disrupt or destroy the indigenous cultures within the territories. Cultural and natural differences complicate many constitutional and
other legal problems in the territories. For example, reapportionment
is still unresolved in some territories where tribal considerations and
geographic separation peculiar to island societies complicate the procedure." A territory may consider departure from certain AngloAmerican legal norms a necessary aspect of cultural autonomy. A territory may wish to give formal legal recognition to the powers of
traditional leaders whose authority comes from custom rather than
the democratic process. For example, in American Samoa, matai
(chiefs) have the exclusive right to serve in the upper' house of the
legislature and control communally-owned land. 2 Also, land is increasingly scarce in island societies due to burgeoning populations. In
some territories, such as Samoa, land ownership is central to social
organization. Territorials fear indigenous control of the land could be
lost to outsiders with large bank rolls and business sophistication. In
some cases territorials have sought to guard against this possibility
by restrictions on alienation that are arguably racial in nature. 3
In passing on the constitutionality of such laws and answering
other territorial legal questions, courts should use thoughtful approaches that take into account not only the values expressed in the
United States Constitution but also the territorials' legitimate aspirations for *culturalautonomy. At the same time, courts should subject
claims of cultural uniqueness to rigorous empirical evaluation as not
all such claims are valid. Reconciling the territorials' desires for cultural preservation with their sometimes conflicting desire for the
rights and privileges of United States citizenship will be a delicate
and ongoing task requiring constant balancing and re-evaluation.
Another side to the problem exists as well. While territorials desire a recognition of their unique needs, some suspect that not all the
disparate treatment of territories in federal law is benign. For example, Congress frequently either exempts territories from the benefits
of certain federal laws or gives them reduced benefits. While eco10. See Baldwin & Laughlin, The Reapportionment Cases: A Study in the Constitutional Adjudication Process, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 301 (1964).
11. Willens & Siemer, The Constitutionof the NorthernMarianaIslands: Constitutional
Principles and Innovation in a Pacific Setting, 65 GEO. L.J. 1373 (1977).
12. See Laughlin, The Application of the Constitution in United States Territories:
American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. HAwAu L. REv. 337, 363-76 (1981).
13. Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, App. No. 010-79, (Am. Samoa, Apr. 23, 1980). For a
discussion of this case, see Laughlin, supra note 12, at 383-87.
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nomic justifications are usually advanced for this treatment, territorials often suspect the discrimination may be due to their lack of representation in Congress. In such cases, territorials must rely on the
courts for protection, as do other groups lacking political power. 4
This article will examine how the courts have dealt with and
should deal with sensitive and critical issues of territorial rights. The
focus is on the Burger Court, which has considered this question with
surprising frequency.' 5 To put the Burger Court's treatment of territorial law in perspective, the discussion will begin with a brief review
of the relevant legal doctrine.
II. STAGES OF TERRITORIAL LAW

The Burger Court writes on a crowded slate. The United States
has had non-state territories from its inception and, since the days of
John Marshall the Court has had many occasions to consider their
status." From an historical perspective, four distinct phases of territorial law are evident. First, in the early to mid-19th century, the
Court applied the ex proprio vigore theory, the idea that the Constitution "of its own force" is fully applicable in all territories."7 This
14. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982) (discussing the constitutional
implications of Justice Stone's note 4 in Carolene Products).
15. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651 (1980); Terrol Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435
U.S. 1 (1978); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970). See also
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico has parenspatrie standing to bring federal declaratory actions); Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S.
195 (1977) (Guam legislature can determine what constitutes appealable cases).
16. See infra note 17; Laughlin, supra note 12.
17. The earliest case law on the subject reflects the assumption that the Constitution was
applicable in the territories, although in some cases Congress extended constitutional guarantees by statute, a fact that would later become the basis for distinguishing those cases. See, e.g.,
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1888) (jury trial provision held applicable in District of
Columbia); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885) (upholding franchise disqualification of bigamists and polygamists in Utah as proper exercise of territorial clause, while acknowledging that
the Constitution guarantees personal rights to territorial inhabitants); First Nat'l Bank v.
County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879) (upholding congressional authorization for Dakota
Territory to issue bonds); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (trial by impartial jury
and first amendment upheld as applicable in Utah, but territorial law governs size of grand jury
because courts are not Article III courts; criminal law against bigamy upheld); Webster v. Reid,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 460 (1851) (Organic Act making civil jury trial provision applicable
supersedes contrary Iowa territorial law); Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 96 (1850)
(Constitution held applicable to Northwest Territory); Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 317, 318-19 (1820) (Constitution held applicable to District of Columbia). But cf. Cross
v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1854) (war tariff and duties imposed under civil government
upon ratification of treaty were held valid until Congress enacted other revenue laws); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (Florida territorial courts exercise jurisdiction pursuant to congressional authorization under territorial clause, not Article
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concept was summed up in the slogan, "the Constitution follows the
flag."1
Then, at the turn of this century, the Court backed away from ex
proprio vigore and opted for a more limited application of the Constitution outside the states. Several theories vied for the Court's acceptance in the early twentieth century, but by 1922 the Court had
unanimously adopted the "incorporation" doctrine.18 As originally
formulated, this doctrine held the Constitution was fully applicable
in a territory only if the territory was incorporated into and became
an integral part of the United States.19 In an unincorporated territory, as all of today's territories probably are, only fundamental constitutional rights were protected. Moreover, in the early incorporation cases, the Court took a rather narrow view of which rights were
fundamental.2 0 The third phase began in the 1950's when a plurality
of the Court moved back toward the ex proprio vigore position and a
majority of the Justices favored at least a presumption of constitu21
tional application wherever United States jurisdiction existed.
In the 1970's, a new complication arose. The Court began to question whether territorial action was federal action or state action. If it
was federal in nature, then the territorial action was subject to the
Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Constitution which act as
limits on the federal government. If deemed state action, however,
then the territorial action was subject to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment and other provisions applicable to states.22 Because each of the above phases of territorial law had a lasting effect
on the constitutional law of United States territories, each must be
examined in more detail.
A. HistoricalBackground
Prior to the Civil War, all of America's non-state territories were
located on the North American continent and were contiguous to the
rest of the United States. During this period, ex proprio vigore, the
idea that the Constitution applied with full force in all areas subject
-to United States jurisdiction, 2 developed and thrived. The most infai).
18.
19.
20.
21.
overseas

See, e.g., Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
Id. at 304-05.
See infra note 67.
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Covert did not involve a territory, but rather an
military base. Nevertheless, the case is extremely important to territorial law. See

infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
22.

See infra notes 110-32 and accompanying text.

23. Although the origin of the phrase is obscure, it is most often remembered as a remark
by Finley Dunne's fictional Mr. Dooley: "No matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or
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mous application of the idea that "the Constitution follows the
'
flag," 24
was in Dred Scott v. Sanford.2 5 In Dred Scott, the Court
ruled the due process and taking clauses of the fifth amendment protected a slaveholder's property rights in his slaves even in the territories because the Constitution reached into both the states and the
territories. Congress was, therefore, without power to outlaw slavery
in the territories. While the Court in Dred Scott sharply disagreed on
whether the Constitution protected slavery, the Justices, as well as
slaveholders and abolitionists, generally agreed the Constitution
should be fully effective in a territory."6
B. The Emergence of the Incorporation Theory
Prior to 1867, all the territories were contiguous to the rest of the
United States and were clearly destined for eventual statehood. In
1867, Alaska became the first non-contiguous territory. Yet even
Alaska was on the North American mainland. Moreover, Alaska was
sparsely populated and, as a later Court noted,2" it was foreseen it
would be settled by people from the states in much the same manner
as the other mainland territories. The doctrine of ex proprio vigore
remained adequate for the day.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the nation
acquired a number of insular possessions. These were acquired in a
variety of ways. In 1898, the United States accepted a cession of the
Hawaiian Islands from the American merchants who had seized them
from the Hawaiian monarchy." In 1899, as a part of the Treaty of
Paris which ended the Spanish-American War, the United States obtained control over Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines.2 9 In
1900, the United States accepted a cession of the eastern portion of
the Samoan archipelago 0 from its indigenous chiefs after having obnot, th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction returns." [commenting on the Insular Cases]. F.
DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 52 (E. Bander ed. 1963). The phrase became a
slogan of the Democratic party in the 1900 elections. See Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held in Kansas City, Missouri, July 4th, 5th & 6th, at 121 (1900)
(quoted in G. SHANKLE, AMERICAN Moros AND SLOGANS (1941)).
24. See supra note 17. Counsel for plaintiffs in error in the Insular Case (see infra note
36) of De Lima v. Bidwell traced the use of the phrase ex proprio vigore in this context back to
Calhoun's debate with Webster on the Missouri Compromise. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1,
52-54 (1901). See also Laughlin, supra note 12, at 344-45 n.35.
25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
26. See id. at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 614 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
27. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
28. Joint Resolution of Annexation of July 7, 1898, J. Res. 55, 30 Stat. 750.
29. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 20, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.I.A.S. No. 343.
30. Cession of Tutuila & Aunu'u, Apr. 27, 1900, reprinted in AM. SAMOA CODE 6 (1973).
See also Cession of Manu'a Islands, July 26, 1904, reprinted in Am. Samoa Code 2-4 (1981).
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tained Britain and Germany's permission to do so." Each of these
territories had substantial non-English-speaking indigenous populations. Our government's vision of their stature was not so clear or
united as it had been with earlier territories.
Some hoped for an American future as a colonial power, something they saw as a continuation of "manifest destiny."3 2 Accordingly, new constitutional theories emerged that were seen as more
compatible with a colonial role. 3 One was the "extension" theory,
which simply held the Constitution applied in a territory only to the
extent Congress had extended the Constitution to that territory. In
other words, only if Congress had clearly manifested its intent that
the Constitution be applicable would a territory be subject to its provisions. This was the view the United States government espoused at
the turn of the century.3 4 On the other hand, opponents of colonialism continued to adhere to the ex proprio vigore philosophy in the
hope that it would either deter future acquisitions or at least insure
that the residents of new territories would become Americans rather
than subjugated peoples.3 5
1. The Insular Cases
These views clashed in a series of six cases that the United States
Supreme Court heard and decided together during its 1900 term.3 6
31. Convention respecting the Samoa Islands, Dec. 2, 1899, United States-Germany-Great
Britain, 31 Stat. 2878, T.LA.S. No. 314.
32. See F. MERK, MANIFsT DESTINY AND MISSION IN AMERicAN ISTORY 247-48 (1963); M
TATE, THE UNrrED STATES AND THE HAwAmAN KINGDOM 265 (2d ed. 1967). See generally R.
WELCH, JR., IERALisTS VS. Abn-IF AmnmisTs (1972).
33. A perceptible shift in the Supreme Court's attitude began to appear in the 1890's. In
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890), the Court
stated that when legislating for the territories Congress is bound by the spirit of the Constitution, but not necessarily by its direct application. In American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464,
466 (1897), the Court questioned the application of the seventh amendment to the territories,
but held the federal statutory right to trial by jury applicable to the Utah territory.
34. In the Insular Cases, the government argued that most of the earlier Supreme Court
opinions that seemed to support ex proprio vigore could be explained on the basis that Congress had in fact indicated its intent that the Constitution apply in the particular territory
involved. This rationale was adopted by Justice Brown in his plurality opinion in Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 258 (1901).
35. See generally Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 HAV.L. REV. 169 (1901) (examination of Insular Cases' inconsistencies).
36. Six cases argued and decided together in the Supreme Court at its 1900 term were
officially designated by the Court to be known as the Insular Tariff Cases, 182 U.S. 1, 2 (1901).
They are more commonly called the Insular Cases. See, e.g., 182 U.S. at 3. The Insular Cases
are: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (Puerto Rico not a foreign country and import duties
levied on sugar were illegal); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901) (Hawaii and Puerto
Rico not foreign countries within meaning of tariff law); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901) (military authority to establish duties on American imports to Puerto Rico ceased with
ratifications of treaty ceding the territory to the United States); Armstrong v. United States,
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The Insular Cases, as they were popularly known, were the Court's
first response to the wave of territorial acquisitions. Of these cases,
the Court addressed the issue of constitutional application in the territories most directly in Downes v. Bidwell."
Downes involved a tariff imposed by Congress 3 on trade between
the states and the newly-acquired territory of Puerto Rico. The shippers 9 maintained the tariff, which was not applicable to trade between two states, violated the "uniformity clause" of the Constitution, which requires tariffs and duties be uniform throughout the
United States.40 The government contended the Constitution, or at
least the uniformity clause, was not applicable to Puerto Rico. The
Court upheld the tariff in a five to four decision, but neither the extention nor the ex proprio vigore theory prevailed. In writing what
182 U.S. 243 (1901) (post-treaty duties on imports recoverable under Dooley); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (uniformity clause of Constitution held inapplicable to Puerto Rico);
Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901) (steamship operating between
New York and Puerto Rico not engaged in foreign trade).
The Court and others have sometimes used the term Insular Cases to include Supreme
Court cases involving the territories decided through 1922. For clarity, cases following the 1900
decisions, through Balzac v. Porto Rico in 1922, are hereinafter referred to as the Latter Insular Cases. They are: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (jury trial provision of sixth
amendment inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (grand
jury provision inapplicable in Phillipines); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (confrontation clause not violated when Philippine court amended defendant's sentence in his absence); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (jury trial provision is applicable in
Alaska); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in Phillipines); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (Congress extended double jeopardy
clause to Phillipines in statutory bill of rights, thereby precluding government appeal of acquittal); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (grand and petit jury clauses inapplicable in Hawaii); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901) (post-treaty duty on foreign imports inapplicable to Philippines); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (duties
on goods moving from states to Puerto Rico upheld).
37. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
38. The Foraker Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1, 11 (1900) imposed the tariff. The main purpose of the
Foraker Act was to establish a civil government for Puerto Rico. The tariff was added in committee. See Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391 (1978).
39. That American merchants were plaintiffs in many early cases reflects a cross current
in the colonialism debate of that time. Those favoring colonialism generally supported limited
application of the Constitution in territories. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, practitioners of colonialism, mainlanders who did business in the territories,
sought constitutional protection against the trade barriers erected against them at the behest of
their mainland competitors. See Laughlin, supra note 12, at 345-46.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States; ..
"
Plaintiffs also challenged the tariff under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, which provides: "[N]or
shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another."
This section 9 argument was weaker because it was more difficult to maintain that Puerto Rico
was a state than to contend it was part of the United States.
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was labeled the "Opinion of the Court," 41 Justice Henry Brown did

rely upon the extension theory. In contrast, the four dissenting Justices continued to adhere to the ex proprio vigore position. 42 Justice
Edward Douglass White's "concurring" opinion, however, actually
had more support from the other majority Justices than Justice
Brown's opinion and did not embrace either the extension theory or
ex proprio vigore.43 Although .Justice White reached the same result
44
as Justice Brown, White's explicit rejection of the extention theory

was important because of later debate over whether there was any
difference between the extention theory and White's incorporation
doctrine which eventually became the law of the land. White, at
least, seems to have thought he was offering an alternative to
extention.
Justice White expressed concern that the extention theory left
territorials' rights dependent on the whim of Congress. He began his
analysis by setting forth several a priori propositions he considered
essential to the resolution of the question before the Court. First, the
Constitution created the United States government and all of the
government's powers must be derived either expressly or implicitly
from that instrument. Second, Justice White stated that because
every function of the government is derived from the Constitution,
.the provisions of that instrument are at all times applicable in all
United States territory. Third, wherever a limitation is imposed on a
power granted by the Constitution, that "restriction operates upon
and confines every action on the subject within its constitutional
limits."
These first three propositions were identical to those upon which
the ex proprio vigore position was premised. Justice White, however,
shifted the direction of the opinion by adding that "[i]n the case of
the territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the
41. The United States Reports labels Justice Brown's opinion the "Opinion of the Court."
The introduction states that Justice Brown "announced the conclusion and judgment of the
court." 182 U.S. at 247.
42. 182 U.S. at 347 (Fuller, C.J., with whom Harlan, Brewer and Peckham, J.J., concur,
dissenting); id. at 375 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Justice White's concurring opinion was joined by Justices Shiras and McKenna. Id. at
287. Justice Gray wrote a separate opinion stating that he "agree[d] with the opinion of Mr.
Justice White." Id. at 345. Because White's opinion avowedly diverged from Brown's, see infra
note 44 and accompanying text, in essence only Justice Brown himself agreed with the extention theory advanced in his "Opinion of the Court," while four Justices agreed with the incorporation theory advanced by Justice White. The other four Justices dissented. Thus began a
subdued war between Justices White and Brown, wherein Justice White treated his incorporation theory as the law of the Downes case. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516
(1905), meanwhile, Justice Brown insisted until his retirement that his extention theory had
been the rule of law there. 197 U.S. at 531-32 (Brown, J., concurring).
44. 182 U.S. at 287 (White, J., concurring). See supra note 42.
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Constitution is invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the
Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the
provision relied on is applicable."4 5 White then addressed the issue of
applicability of the uniformity clause raised by Downes:
The sole and only issue, then, . . . is whether the particular
tax in question was levied in such form as to cause it to be
repugnant to the Constitution. This is to be resolved by answering the inquiry, had Porto Rico, at the time of the passage of the act in question, been incorporated
into and be46
come an integral part of the United States?
At first blush, Justice White's determination that Puerto Rico had
not "been incorporated into and become an integral part of the
United States" might appear to be simply an interpretation of the
term "United States" as used in the uniformity clause. The rest of
the opinion, however, indicates, and later cases confirm, that incorporation has a much broader significance as to constitutional application in the territories.4 7 In short, the doctrine White announced provided that while the Constitution is fully applicable in a territory
only if the territory has been "incorporated into and become an integral part of the United States," fundamental rights are protected in
48
all territories.
Clearly, White did not assume a territory automatically becomes
an integral part of the United States at annexation, although he was
far from clear as to just what it takes to incorporate a territory. 49 He
purported to take a position somewhere between the Brown opinion
and the dissenters, although dissenting Justice Harlan contended
there was little practical difference between White's incorporation
50
doctrine and Brown's extention theory.
Justice White claimed to find support for his doctrine in the early
history of United States territorial acquisition. Indeed, the term "in45. 182 U.S. at 288-89, 292.
46. Id. at 299.
47. Id. at 287-344. The Court had earlier faced the question of whether the term "United
States" in the uniformity clause included the District of Columbia. Justice Marshall said the
term was not limited to the states which are united but includes the whole of the "American
empire." Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319 (1820). It may have been due in
part to this expansive interpretation of the precise working of the uniformity clause that Justice White cast his argument in broader terms.
48. Although the Constitution was deemed fully applicable only to incorporated territories, fundamental rights were considered protected in all territories. 182 U.S. at 291. Justice
Brown's opinion also suggested that certain fundamental rights would be protected in all territories. Id. at 268-69, 277, 282-83.
49. Id. at 291.
50. Id. at 389 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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corporated into the United States" had been used in the Louisiana
Treaty and in a draft treaty prepared in the course of uncompleted
negotiations to annex Hawaii in 1854.51 Neither the text of those
treaties nor their legislative histories, however, made clear what was
meant by this phrase. Further, the term "incorporated" as applied to
a territory had no generally understood legal definition at the time of
Downes.52 Justice White left the term undefined in Downes, although
he determined Puerto Rico was not incorporated. Justice Harlan
complained that the term had "some occult meaning which my mind
does not apprehend." 53 Even supporters of the incorporation theory
conceded the vagueness of the concept, some claiming the doctrine's
5 4
inexactness was its strength.
While refusing to use incorporation terminology, Chief Justice
Fuller's dissent in Downes suggested something akin to incorporation
had been accomplished by the Foraker Act, which imposed the challenged tariff and also established a civil government for Puerto Rico.
According to Justice Fuller:
The question is whether, when Congress has created a civil
government for Porto Rico, has constituted its inhabitants a
body politic, has given it a governor and other officers, a legislative assembly, and courts, with right of appeal to this court,
Congress can, in the same act and in the exercise of the power
conferred by the [first clause of section eight], impose duties
on the commerce between Porto Rico and the states and other
territories in contravention of the rule of uniformity qualifying the power.55
This argument would have placed Justice White in a dilemma if
he had addressed the issue directly. The fact Congress had levied a
non-uniform tariff on Puerto Rico in the Foraker Act may be evidence Congress did not intend the uniformity clause be made applicable to Puerto Rico by the same act. If Justice White were to contend incorporation depended upon the specific intent of Congress to
make the Constitution applicable in a territory, however, then his
doctrine would be no different than the extension theory of Justice
51. Treaty Regarding Cession of Louisiana, Apr. 30, 1803, United States-France, art. III,
8 Stat. 200, T.I.A.S. No. 86; S. ExEc. Doc. No. 681, 55th Congress, 2d Sess. 91 (1854), cited in
182 U.S. at 305.
52. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of TerritorialIncorporation,26 COLUM L.
REv. 823, 832 (1926).
53. 182 U.S. at 391 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Fuller also used the word "occult" in
describing the incorporation doctrine. Id. at 373 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
54. Coudert, supra note 52, at 850.
55. 182 U.S. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

Brown. Congress could consciously choose whether the Constitution
would apply to a given territory, the very result Justice White found
objectionable in the extention theory. On the other hand, if incorporation depended on the nature of the relationship of the territory to
the United States, there was obviously merit to Justice Fuller's suggestion that Congress had made the Constitution applicable in Puerto Rico by creating for the territory a civil government modeled
after that of a state.
In response, Justice White portrayed Justice Fuller's position as
internally contradictory:
I fail to see how it is possible,. on the one hand, to declare that
Congress in passing the act had exceeded its powers by treating Porto Rico as not incorporated into the United States,
and, at the same time, it be said that the provisions of the act
itself amount to an incorporation of Porto Rico into the
United
States, although the treaty had not previously done
6
5

SO.

Justice White concluded:
It in reason cannot be that the act is void because it seeks to
keep the island disincorporated, and, at the same time, that
material provisions are not to be enforced because the act
does incorporate. Two irreconcilable views of that act cannot
be taken at the same time,
the consequence being to cause it
57
to be unconstitutional.
Contrary to Justice White's assertion, Justice Fuller did not argue
the Act was "void because it seeks to keep the island disincorporated
"5 8 Rather, Justice Fuller contended the duty provisions
of the Act were unconstitutional because other portions of the Act
had in essence incorporated Puerto Rico and thus made the Constitution fully applicable there. If Congress expressly incorporated Pu56. Id. at 341 (White, J., concurring).
57. Id. Justice White seemed to premise his argument on the assumption the Foraker Act
must either be entirely valid or entirely void, a patently false premise under well-established
constitutional principles. The export duty that was at issue in Downes was added to the
Foraker Act as an amendment. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 391, 426-27 (1978). While courts should try to reconcile all portions of an act, at times the
conclusion that a legislative body has adopted a law that has contradictory provisions is inescapable. This is most likely to occur where, as here, one provision was an unwelcome amendment. Thus the conclusion that Congress had incorporated Puerto Rico by the Foraker Act and
hence made the Constitution applicable there, while at the same time imposing, or attempting
to impose, an unconstitutional tax on Puerto Rico, is not, as Justice White argues, a logically
impossible position.
58. 182 U.S. at 341 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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erto Rico by passing the Foraker Act, but in another portion of the
same Act levied an unconstitutional tax, a severability problem
would have existed. If Congress can create objective conditions that
result in incorporation of a territory, as Justice Fuller thought Cbngress had done to Puerto Rico by the Foraker Act, the same severability problem exists.59 This problem could be resolved in one of
three ways. A court could strike down the entire Act, strike down the
incorporation and uphold the tax, or uphold the incorporation and
strike down the tax. The third of these alternatives would have been
the most reasonable course for the Court to follow in resolving the
severability problem because the establishment of a civil government
for Puerto Rico was the main purpose of the Foraker Act and the tax
was merely a rider.
On the other hand, if a territory can be incorporated only if Cor.gress has a specific intent 0 to make the Constitution applicable
there, Justice White's rebuttal of Justice Fuller makes more sense. If
the specific intent criteria is employed, Congress' imposition of a tax
on Puerto Rico indicates Congress did not intend to incorporate Puerto Rico by other provisions in the same Act. This lack of intent to
incorporate may be inferred because imposition of a tax on Puerto
Rico upon incorporation would be unconstitutional.
Under a specific intent concept of incorporation, a territory would
never be incorporated unless Congress manifests its desire the Constitution fully apply there. Accordingly, Congress could elevate a territory and its people to a status just short of statehood. So long as
Congress, expressly or impliedly, indicates it does not want the Constitution to fully apply there, however, the territory would remain
unincorporated. So construed, the incorporation doctrine is virtually
indistinguishable from the extension doctrine advanced by Justice
Brown and rejected by Justice White.
Under an objective theory of incorporation, Congress might bring
about certain objective circumstances which would incorporate the
territory even though Congress had the specific intent not to do so.
An analogous situation arises when Congress admits a territory to
statehood. Congress cannot create a state and withhold constitutional
rights from it. 6 1 The requisite objective circumstances necessary to
incorporate under an objective theory would necessarily consist of
something short of admission to statehood because the incorporation
doctrine applies only to territories.
59. See generally Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305, 312 (1881) (discussing the severability issue).
60. As used, the term "specific intent" is inexactly borrowed from criminal law.
61. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

Despite implications to the contrary in the exchange between Justices White and Fuller, an objective basis for incorporation must be
assumed if one is to take seriously Justice White's insistence that incorporation is a separate and distinct approach for resolving questions of constitutional application in the territories. Justice White
clearly refused to accept the extention theory because it left the constitutional protection of territorials to the discretion of Congress.
Hence one must assume Justice White did not believe the incorporation doctrine would produce the same result.
A contemporary of Justice White believed the Justice meant that
incorporated territories were those which Congress would eventually
endow with statehood. 2 For a court to apply that rule, however, it
would need more prescience than currently exists.6 3 Another case
suggests the goal of the incorporation doctrine is to separate territories that the United States intends to be permanent from those, such
as the Philippines, which were generally understood to be moving toward independence.64 This also would be a difficult criterion to apply,
however, because with most territories there is seldom a consensus on
their future status.
In early cases, lawyers most likely assumed incorporation depended upon the relationship between the territory and the United
States. Arguments were based on such factors as whether laws of general application were extended to the territory, or whether its residents were given the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. 5 Incorporation was probably considered the middle ground
that Justice White proposed in that it would not leave constitutional
protection of the territories solely dependent upon the will of
Congress. 6
Under an objective theory, congressional action plays a major role
in determining whether a territory is "incorporated." Having created
the objective conditions resulting in incorporation, however, Congress
cannot prevent constitutional application simply by stating a desire
that the Constitution not apply. Or so it would have seemed.
2. Settling the Doctrine
For the first two decades of the twentieth century, the validity of
62. See Coudert, supra note 52, at 834.
63. A comparison of the history of Hawaii and of Alaska is illustrative. Hawaii was held to
be unincorporated in 1903. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903). Alaska was held to be
incorporated in 1905. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). Both were admitted to
statehood in 1959.
64. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
65. See id. See also Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
66. 258 U.S. at 309.
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the incorporation doctrine remained in question. This was due in
large measure to both Justice Brown's persistent claim that his extention theory opinion stated the law of the Downes case and Justice
John Marshall Harlan's dogged adherence to the ex proprio vigore
theory for the remainder of his long term on the high bench.67 The
67. In 1903, the Court considered Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903), the first of a
series of cases dealing with the application to the territories of the fifth amendment guarantee
of a grand jury and the sixth amendment guarantee of a jury trial in criminal cases. Mankichi
had been convicted in Hawaii of manslaughter. Pursuant to Hawaiian statutory law kept in
force after annexation, he had been tried without indictment and convicted by a vote of nine
out of twelve jurors.
In the United States Supreme Court, defense counsel was prepared to argue for application
of the fifth and sixth amendments under either the extention or the incorporation theory. The
defense relied heavily upon the following language in the congressional resolution by which the
United States annexed Hawaii: "The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands,... not
inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States
nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the
United States shall otherwise determine." Id. at 209 (emphasis in original).
Justice Brown wrote the opinion of the Court, while Justice White wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice McKenna joined. The four dissenters in Downes dissented again. Not surprisingly, Justices Brown and White adhered to their former doctrinal positions: Brown to "exteition" and White to "incorporation."
Despite the seemingly plain meaning of the annexation resolution, Justice Brown decided
it was not Congress' intent to extend the constitution to Hawaii. Justice White believed it was
not Congress' intent to incorporate the territory. Both Justices concurred that rights to a grand
and petit jury were not fundamental, as they had each used that term in Downes. 190 U.S. at
218-19, 221.
In Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), the Court held the sixth amendment jury
trial guarantee was inapplicable to the Philippines. Id. at 149. The majority opinion was written
by Justice Day, who had come to the Court since the original Insular Cases. Although Justice
Day seemed to use an incorporation analysis, Justice Brown, as well as Justice White, apparently concurred because neither wrote a separate opinion. Justices Peckham, Fuller and Brewer
concurred in result on the authority of Mankichi, but specifically disavowed reliance on any
opinion in Downes, noting that no opinion there had commanded a majority. Id. at 153-54.
The following year, in Rassmussen, the Court overturned a misdemeanor conviction based
on the verdict of a six-person Alaskan jury, holding the sixth amendment applicable in Alaska.
197 U.S. at 528. Justice White's majority opinion marked the first and apparently only time the
Supreme Court expressly held a territory had been incorporated. Id. at 525. Justice Brown
concurred in result, but wrote a separate opinion repudiating the incorporation doctrine and
reiterating his belief that congressional extention was the true test of whether the Constitution
applied to a territory. Id. at 531-35. The following year, Justice Brown retired from the Court
and with him went the extention doctrine.
In Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), the Court, citing Dorr,held the right to
confront witnesses did not exist in the Philippines, stating "[I]t is unnecessary to repeat the
reasons for [the] conclusion, announced in the Dorr Case." Id. at 332. Nor did the grand jury
guarantee apply in the Philippines. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (citing
Mankichi, Dorrand Dowdell for the proposition that "in this respect the Constitution does not,
of its own force, apply to the Islands" and giving no further explanation for the holding).
Finally, in Balzac in 1922, the Court unanimously and unequivocally adopted the incorporation doctrine:
The Insular Cases revealed much diversity of opinion in this Court as to the constitutional status of the territory acquired by the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish War,
but the Dorr Case shows that the opinion of Mr. Justice White of the majority, in
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incorporation doctrine was used in Rassmussen v. United States,"8
where the Court held the territory of Alaska was incorporated. The
majority relied on "objective" criteria such as the language of the
treaty acquiring Alaska from Russia, the fact many federal laws had
been made applicable there, the creation of the Federal Court of
Alaska and, in particular, the fact Alaska's residents had been made
United States citizens. Yet while Justice Brown and three dissenters
from Downes concurred in the result, they refused to accept the incorporation theory as legitimate doctrine.
The first time the Supreme Court unanimously accepted the incorporation doctrine was in the 1922 case of Balzac v. Porto Rico."
Ironically, the same case interpreted the doctrine so as to make it
practically indistinguishable from the extention theory. The issue in
Balzac was whether the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee was
applicable to criminal trials in Puerto Rico. Counsel for the defendant obviously used Rassmussen as his guide for arguing Puerto Rico
was incorporated. To distinguish Downes v. Bidwell, he argued Puerto Rico had become incorporated subsequent to Downes because,
inter alia, Congress had extended many federal laws to Puerto
Rico,7 0 had established a federal district court there and, in 1917, had
granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans. 71 Despite the
strong "objective" case, the Supreme Court disagreed. Chief Justice
Taft's analysis seemingly made the specific intent of Congress determinative. Taft noted that by the time this case reached the courts,
Congress should have been familiar with the incorporation theory.
Thus he considered it significant that Congress had not made express
any intention to incorporate Puerto Rico and ruled that incorporation could not be assumed
in the absence of such an express congres72
sional declaration.
Downes v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the court.
258 U.S. at 305. The opinion in Balzac was written by Chief Justice Taft. Justice McKenna was
the only remaining Justice of those who had participated in the original Insular Cases. After
finally settling the doctrinal issue, the Court found Puerto Rico was still not incorporated and
the sixth amendment right to jury trial was still not applicable there. Id. at 313.
68. 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
69. 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See supra note 67.
70. 258 U.S. at 305.
71. Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (known as the "Jones Act").
72. In Chief Justice Taft's words:
Before the question became acute at the close of the Spanish War, the distinction between acquisition and incorporation was not regarded as important, or at least it was not
fully understood and had not aroused great controversy. Before that, the purpose of Congress might well be a matter of mere inference from various legislative acts; but in these
latter days, incorporation is not to be assumed without express declaration, or an implication so strong as to exclude any other view.
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The Court noted that the Jones Act, which, inter alia, granted
Puerto Ricans United States citizenship, also contained a statutory
Bill of Rights for Puerto Rico. These rights included all of the guarantees of the first eight amendments to the United States Constitution, save only the rights to indictment by grand jury and to trial by
petit jury in criminal cases. The Chief Justice noted that if Congress
had intended to incorporate Puerto Rico by this Act, the complete
Bill of Rights would have ex proprio vigore been made applicable to
Puerto Rico. Accordingly, Congress' explicit limitation of the rights
granted provided a basis for inferring that incorporation was not
intended."3
3. Justice Brown's Revenge
The Court conceded, in light of Rassmussen, that the grant of citizenship created an inference of incorporation. The inference, however, was deemed rebuttable and in the case of Puerto Rico was rebutted.7 4 In essence, while the Court conceded that most of the
indices of incorporation relied upon in Rassmussen were present in
Balzac, incorporation was not found because Congress had not expressly stated an intent to incorporate. Thus, it might have appeared
that while Justice White had won the battle over which doctrine
should nominally prevail, Justice Brown had won the war. For if the
status of incorporation is purely a matter of congressional intent,
then constitutional protection for territorials is as dependent on the
will of Congress under the incorporation doctrine as it would have
been under extention.75 The incorporation doctrine, however, does
not leave territorials at the mercy of Congress. First, Rassmussen
makes it clear once Congress has established constitutional protec258 U.S. at 306.

73. The Chief Justice asked rhetorically.
If it was intended to incorporate Porto Rico into the Union by this act, which would ex
proprio vigore make applicable the whole Bill of Rights of the Constitution to the Island,
why was it thought necessary to create for it a Bill of Rights and carefully exclude trial
by jury? In the very forefront of the act is this substitute for incorporation and application of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. This seems to us a conclusive argument
against the contention of counsel for the plaintiff in error.
258 U.S. at 306-07.
74. Id. at 312. The Court was not swayed either by the fact that many general United
States laws had been made applicable in Puerto Rico, or by the fact Congress had created a
United States District Court for Puerto Rico, indicia deemed important to the finding in Rassmussen that Alaska was incorporated. The Court held the United States District Court for
Puerto Rico was not a "true United States Court established under Article [III] .

. .,"

but

rather one created under the territorial power, despite its similarity in jurisdiction to "true"
Article III courts. 258 U.S. at 312.
75. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 270-71.
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tion for a territory it cannot be withdrawn, at least not by the mere
expedient of passing an unconstitutional law. Whether Congress
could, by explicit declaration, revoke incorporation is an issue the
Court has never faced. Yet it is clear acts of Congress can be unconstitutional in an incorporated territory.7" Second, the incorporation
doctrine recognizes that provisions of the Constitution which protect
fundamental rights, however that term may be defined, are applicable even in unincorporated territories."
Most importantly, working within the framework of the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme Court has further developed the constitutional law of territories in a way which has significantly enhanced
constitutional protection for them. While the modern Court still accepts the incorporation -doctrine as the beginning point for analysis,
its interpretation of the doctrine protects constitutional rights of territorials much more than Balzac and some of the other early cases
would suggest. The Court no longer reads the Insular Cases as prescribing merely a two-tiered system whereby territories are divided
into those in which the Constitution is fully applicable and those
where only the most rudimentary rights are enforced. Rather, the
Court seems to be moving toward an approach in which all constitutional rights are potentially applicable in every territory. This approach does, however, allow exceptions to be made where significant
cultural or other differences make rigid application inappropriate.7 8
C. The Modern Era
A new phase in the development of territorial law began in the
1950's, spearheaded by Justice Hugo Black. In 1956, the Supreme
Court decided Reid v. Covert.79 This case did not involve a territory
as such, but it has had profound ramifications for territorial law. In
Covert, two defendants, both wives of United States servicemen, were
charged with murdering their respective husbands on a United States
military base in a foreign country.8 0 Congress, in legislation implementing status of forces agreements with the host countries, had purported to subject civilians accompanying the Armed Forces abroad to
76. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
77. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 280-81 (opinion of Brown, J.); id. at 294-95 (White, J.,
concurring).
78. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
79. 354 U.S. 1 (1956). The cited opinion was issued on rehearing. The original opinion,
published at 351 U.S. 487, was withdrawn by the Court. Id.
80. Defendant Covert was charged with murdering her husband on a United States
airbase in England. Defendant Smith was charged with murdering her husband on a United
States Army post in Japan. Both women were convicted by courts martial and sentenced to life
imprisonment. 354 U.S. at 4.
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military court martial jurisdiction."- The defendants argued this procedure violated their sixth amendment right to trial by jury. The government attempted to analogize military bases abroad to territories
and argued that the Insular Cases stand for the proposition that the
Constitution is not fully applicable outside the states. The United
States Supreine Court, however, sided with the defendants although
the Court produced no majority opinion.
Justice Black, writing for a four-man plurality, severely criticized
the Insular Cases as espousing a "dangerous doctrine" born of "expediency. "' 2 While this criticism cast doubt on the continuing validity
of the Insular Cases, Justice Black ultimately distinguished them
and held their doctrine should not be expanded.8 3 On the surface, of
course, the facts of Covert and those of the Insular Cases were different. The precedent case involved a United States territory while Covert involved a United States military enclave on foreign soil. The rationale for the distinction was nevertheless dubious. Justice Black
contended the rule of the Insular Cases was made for the temporary
governance of alien people and had no application to cases involving
American citizens.84 Such an interpretation of the doctrine could
have been valid at the time of Downes v. Bidwell. Yet such a distinction hardly explains how a unanimous court in Balzac applied the
incorporation doctrine to Puerto Rico, which had been a United
States territory for twenty-three years and whose people were then
United States citizens. The very weakness of this distinction, coupled
with Justice Black's characterization of the Insular Cases as a dangerous doctrine, suggests his fundamental disagreement with the incorporation theory as construed in Balzac.
1. Ex Proprio Vigore's Latter-Day Champion
The position of the plurality in Covert appeared very close to that
of the first Mr. Justice Harlan as expressed in his dissent in the Insular Cases.8 5 In Black's view, all authority of the United States gov81. U.C.M.J. art. 2(11), 50 U.S.C. § 552(11) (Supp. 11 1956 & Supp. V 1958). See Agreement Respecting Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses Committed by Armed Forces, July 27Aug. 6, 1942, United States-Great Britain, 57 Stat. 1193, E.A.S. No. 355; Administrative
Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty, 3 U.S.T. 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492.
82. 354 U.S. at 14.
83. Id.
84. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1956).
85. Compare, for example, Justice Black in Reid v. Covert:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary
government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates
otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government. If our foreign
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ernment is both derived from and limited by the Constitution. While
the Constitution expressly allows at least one exemption," and perhaps implies others, from the restrictions of the Bill of Rights when
the Armed Forces deals with its own, Black believed that no concept
of necessity should extend those exemptions to non-military United
States citizens.
2. The Harlan Opinion - Root of Contemporary Doctrine
Justice Black's opinion, however, did not have the support of five
Justices. To provide a majority in favor of the defendants, the concurring vote of either Justice Harlan or Frankfurter was needed.87 In
complimentary opinions, the concurring Justices viewed the Insular
Cases more favorably, seeing them as examples of the balancing approach to constitutional jurisprudence that they advocated.88 In the
process, the concurring Justices gave new vitality to the Insular
Cases.
Originally, the incorporation doctrine simply separated the incorporated territories from the unincorporated ones. Justices Harlan
and Frankfurter, however, read the Insular Cases in a broader context as teaching how constitutional application outside the states
should be approached.8 9 Justice Frankfurter said: "The territorial
cases, in the emphasis put by them on the necessity for considering
the specific circumstances of each particular case, are thus relevant in
that they provide an illustrative method for harmonizing constitucommitments become of such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily
operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be
amended by the method which it prescribes. But we have no authority, or inclination, to
read exceptions into it which are not there.
354 U.S. at 14 (footnotes omitted) with the first Justice Harlan dissenting in Downes v.
Bidwell:
It was said that the United States is to become what is called a "world power;" and that
if this government intends to keep abreast of the times and be equal to the great destiny
that awaits the American people, it must be allowed to exert all the power that other
nations are accustomed to exercise. My answer is, that the fathers never intended that
the authority and influence of this nation should be exerted otherwise than in accordance with the Constitution. IF our Government needs more power than is conferred
upon it by the Constitution, that instrument provides the mode in which it may be
amended and additional power thereby obtained.
182 U.S. at 386 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86. The fifth amendment guarantee of a grand jury explicitly exempts cases "arising in
the land or naval forces." U.S. CozST. amend. V.
87. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 65 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
88. Id at 53-54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 67, 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 45-46 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 77-78 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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tional provisions which appear, separately considered, to be conflicting." 90 In contrast, Justice Frankfurter believed the fact the crime
was punishable by the "irrevocable" penalty of death gave Mrs. Covert a right to a jury trial.9 1
Justice Harlan also objected to what he understood to be the plurality's discarding of the Insular Cases as historical anomalies. Those
cases, he said, "properly understood, still have vitality."9 2 Harlan believed the Insular Cases do not stand for the proposition the Constitution does not apply overseas, but rather "that there are provisions
of the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place. ' 93 According to Justice Harlan: "the
question is which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in
view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and
the possible alternatives which Congress had before it."9 4 Justice
Harlan then made an effort to bridge the gap between the Insular
Cases and the apparent desire expressed by the plurality in Covert
for a broader applicability of the Constitution outside the geographic
confines of the states. Justice Harlan stated the Insular Cases stood
for the proposition some constitutional provisions do not necessarily
apply in every circumstance in all foreign places, rather than for the
proposition the Constitution is never applicable overseas.
To take but one example: Balzac v. Porto Rico . . . is not
good authority for the proposition that jury trials need never
be provided for American citizens tried by the United States
abroad; but the case is good authority for the proposition that
there is no rigid rule that jury trial must always be provided
in the trial of an American overseas, if the circumstances are
such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous.95
Justice Harlan believed the government had established that for
run-of-the-mill cases overseas jury trials would be impractical and
anomalous.9 6 He agreed, however, with Justice Frankfurter that this
was not a run-of-the-mill case. Because the possibility of a death sentence existed, the sixth amendment was applicable despite the obvi97
ous difficulty of impaneling a jury overseas.
This flexible approach currently has appeal to territorials, not90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
45-46 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
67 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74 (emphasis in original).
75 (emphasis in original).
74-75 (emphasis in original).
75-76.
77-78.
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withstanding its roots in American colonial aspirations. Territorials
see themselves as having special needs that may at times justify laws
inconsistent with interpretations of the Constitution applicable to
the states. Some of these involve cultural differences as in American
Samoa where indigenous chiefs, or matai, control communally-owned
land and have the exclusive right to sit in the upper house of the
legislature. Others involve an amalgam of cultural, geophysical, political and economic factors. For example, both Samoa and the Northern Marianas have attempted to restrict land ownership to indigenous people, such restrictions having been criticized as amounting to
racial classification. Samoans and Marianans fear that given the scarcity of land on the islands as well as the relative lack of business
sophistication, and the low cash incomes of many of the indigenous
people, free alienation might render their people landless in their
own homeland. Rather than attempt to subsume all of these considerations under the equal protection analysis generally applicable in
the states, the courts would do well to consider the more basic question of whether equal protection should mean the same thing in these
territories as it does in states.
3. The King Rule
The Supreme Court could obtain guidance in these matters from
lower court decisions. In one case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted an approach that synthesizes the Insular
Cases with the Covert plurality and concurrences. This approach assumes that, even in an unincorporated territory, all parts of the Constitution are presumptively applicable. The presumption can be rebutted, however, by proof the application of a particular provision in
the context in which it arises would be impractical or anomalous.
King v. Morton9 8 involved the applicability of the sixth amendment to American Samoa. For seventy-seven years prior to King, the
territory made no provision for jury trials in criminal cases, a policy
which it justified on two grounds. First, under Samoa's traditional
matai system, the matai, or chiefs, would exercise undue influence
over family members serving on juries. 9 Second, Samoans would be
unwilling to convict fellow Samoans due to strong feelings of kinship. 10 0 The defendant, King, was charged with evading Samoan income tax. King collaterally attacked Samoa's failure to provide jury
trials in criminal cases by bringing an action for mandamus against
98. 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975), on remand sub nom. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11
(D.D.C. 1977). See also Laughlin, supra note 12, at 376-81.
99. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. at 12-15.
100. Id.
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the Secretary of the Interior in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. The district court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 10 1 The court of appeals reversed and gave guidance
for trial on the merits.
According to the court of appeals, the Insular Cases and Balzac
stated the applicable law. The court's interpretation of those cases,
however, followed the second Justice Harlan's concurrence in Covert.
As Justice Harlan wrote in Covert, "the particular local setting, the
practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to a
question of judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a
necessary condition of the exercise of Congress' power to provide for
the trial of Americans overseas." 0 2 Based on Justice Harlan's language, the court of appeals stated the underlying issue was whether
the circumstances in American Samoa were such that a jury trial
would be impractical or anomalous. °3 In language obviously meant
for the trial court on remand, the court of appeals also stated the
"decision in this case [must] rest on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural development of American Samoa. That understanding cannot be based on unsubstantiated opinion; it must be
10
' 4
based on facts.
On remand, the district court held the sixth amendment was applicable. 01 5 The district court clearly understood the rule of the case
to be that the government should have the burden of proving the
jury trial requirement would be impractical or anomalous in American Samoa. Also, the court clearly expected the government to show
more than a rational basis for that contention. At trial, the government relied on the testimony of some Samoan matai who stated they
believed other chiefs might try to influence family members serving
on juries. The district court noted, however, that on cross-examination these witnesses conceded that they personally would not engage
in such illegal activity and they had failed to explain why they be101. The jurisdictional issue was one of considerable importance for Samoa. American
Samoa is not a part of any federal judicial district or circuit. There is no statutory procedure
for appealing a decision of the High Court of American Samoa to the Article I courts. King
collaterally attacked the High Court's refusal to provide him with a jury trial by suing the
Secretary of Interior in the District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus.
The court of appeals noted that district courts have jurisdiction over mandamus actions if a
clearly established duty exists. See 520 F.2d at 1146.
Samoans generally welcomed the opening of this avenue into the Article El courts. The
process is, however, awkward and expensive, involving litigation 8,000 miles from home.
Through 1984, the process had not been used except in the King case itself.
102. Id. at 1147 (emphasis in original).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. at 17.
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lieved their fellow matai to be less law-abiding than themselves. 106
Similarly, the district court found the government's claim Samoan
jurors would refuse to convict fellow Samoans was undercut by evidence that Samoans served as police, prosecutors and judges and had
demonstrated a willingness to put their guilty compatriots behind
0 7

bars.1

Thus one can extrapolate from King the rule that there is a presumption of constitutional applicability in the territories which can
be rebutted only by a clear and convincing showing that the application of a specific constitutional provision in a particular context
would be impractical or anomalous. This approach is a sound one.' 08
It does not undervalue the constitutional claims of territorial residents. It does, however, recognize the possibility that some provisions
of the Constitution, at least as they are interpreted for the states,
may be inconsistent with the unique cultural institutions of the territories, institutions which the United States has committed itself to
preserve. 09
III. THE FEDERAL-STATE AMBIVALENCE
A new question concerning constitutional application in the terri-

tories arose in a series of cases from Puerto Rico shortly after it
achieved Commonwealth status in 1952. While the origins of the
problem related in part to the unique nature of commonwealth status, it has spilled over into general territorial law. The question deals
with whether the actions of a territorial government are properly
characterized as "federal action" or "state action." If the actions of a
territorial government are deemed federal in nature, they are directly
subject to the limitations of the Bill of Rights and other provisions of
the Constitution applicable to the federal government. If territorial
government actions are deemed state actions, however, they are subject to the fourteenth amendment and other provisions limiting the
states. This issue was not involved in the Insular Cases, as those

cases dealt with congressional legislation and with United States military actions, both of which were clearly federal in nature." 0 This
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Laughlin, supra note 12, at 376-81.
109. For example, it might be impractical or anamolous to apply the equal protection
clause to invalidate territorial laws designed to insure that land ownership remains with indigenous people. Laughlin, supra note 12, at 386.
110. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), and Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901), involved general federal revenue laws. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901), and
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1902), dealt with duties imposed on Puerto Rico by
the United States military commander during the Spanish-American War. Downes v. Bidwell,
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issue was not discussed in the "latter" Insular Cases either, for even
when acts of territorial governments were involved the courts apparently assumed territorial action was federal action.11 ' In recent years,
however, several courts including the Supreme Court have suggested
there is doubt as to whether territorial action should be considered
federal action or state action for constitutional purposes.
A. The Nature of TerritorialGovernment
To set the parameters of this problem, it is necessary to examine
the nature of territorial government. In addition to the distinction
between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territories created in
the Insular Cases, there is a distinction between "organized" and
"unorganized" territories. An organized territory is one for which
Congress has, by an organic act, either established a government or
authorized the inhabitants to adopt a constitution and thereby establish a government. 112 In the latter case, the act may instruct the people to organize a "republican form of government" and admonish
them to include protection of basic civil rights. 113 Congress may also
reserve the right to approve the territorial constitution. An unorganized territory has no organic act and traditionally was governed by
the President or his designee under laws adopted by Congress. 1 4 In
182 U.S. 244 (1901), involved a special tariff levied by Congress on Puerto Rico. Huus v. New
York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901), involved a federal statute regulating the coasting trade.
111. For example, Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903), attacked a Hawaii statute
that provided for trial upon information in felony cases and conviction by nine of twelve jurors.
The statute had been adopted by the Hawaiian legislature and was kept in force pursuant to
Congress' annexation resolution. Mankichi had been convicted of manslaughter under procedures created by the assimilated statutes. The federal district court in Hawaii granted a writ of
habeas corpus, but the Supreme Court reversed. The government argued Hawaii "was only
doing what a State of the Union may do" and that the "Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply
only to the Courts of the United States." 190 U.S. at 201-02. The Court, lining up as it had in
the Insular Cases, ignored that issue and discussed the extention, incorporation and ex proprio
vigore theories as it had in earlier cases clearly arising under federal law.
112. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 731(b) (1982) (authorization for Puerto Rico Constitution); Act
of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-584, 90 Stat. 2899 (authorization for Virgin Island and Guam
Constitutions). Similarly, Congress approved the Covenant transforming the Northern Mariana
Islands from a trust territory to a commonwealth. J. Res. of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241,
90 Stat. 263. The Covenant expressly allows self-governance in accordance with the commonwealth constitution. Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
Feb. 15, 1975, United States-Northern Marianas, art. I1, LL.M. 346, reprinted in S. REP. No.
433, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Covenant].
113. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 731(b) (1982).
114. American Samoa is governed under the following statute:
Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands, all civil, judicial, and
military powers shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such
manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President shall have
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either an organized or an unorganized territory, logic suggests the
territorial government is exercising authority delegated to it by the
United States government and that its action is therefore federal action for constitutional purposes.
The argument territorial action is state action and is thus limited
by the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment is more
subtle. Notably, Justice Rehnquist recently said the "plain meaning"
of the amendment precludes such an interpretation because the territories simply are not states. 115 In support of the state action theory,
two contentions can be made. First, the Supreme Court has construed the word "state" in some, but by no means all, federal statutes
to include territory.' This suggests the possibility that the word
"state" in the fourteenth amendment could be so construed.
Second, 42 U.S.C. § 19-83, the basic civil rights statute for the enforcement of fourteenth amendment rights, refers to action under
color of the law of any "state or territory. ' 117 The words "or territory" were not in the original 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act from which
power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so occasioned.
Act of February 20, 1929, ch. 281, § (c), 45 Stat. 1253, 48 U.S.C. § 1661(c) (1982). Today, American Samoa is the only unorganized territory with a substantial permanent population and
there the distinction between organized and unorganized has blurred. The President currently
administers Samoa through the Secretary of Interior. Exec. Order No. 10264, 3 C.F.R. 765
(1949-1953 Compilation), reprinted in 48 U.S.C. § 1662 note (1982). The Secretary has authorized the people of Samoa to adopt a constitution and under it they elect a governor, a legislature, and have access to a High Court presided over by justices appointed by the Secretary. AM.
SAMOA CONST. art. IV (executive branch); id. art. II (legislature); id. art. III (judicial branch).
The present American Samoa Conslitution was ratified and approved on June 2, 1967 by then
Secretary of Interior Stewart L. Udall. The practical distinction between Samoa and an organized territory is that, in theory at least, the Secretary or the President could alter or withdraw
any of these institutions or otherwise directly intervene in Samoan affairs. See POLrrMCAL
STATUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 43-44. Constitutional amendments in American Samoa, after
having been ratified by the people, are formally accomplished by administrative order of the
Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. of Int. Order No.
3009, §§ 2, 4, (amending art. IV, § 2 of the American Samoa Constitution, which makes the
office of governor elective rather than appointive), reprinted in AM. SAMOA CONsT. art. IV, § 2,
AM. SAMOA CODE (1982) (note). In an organized territory, only Congress can change these
arrangements.
115. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 607 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
116. See infra notes 145, 158-59 and accompanying text. But see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
117. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added).
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section 1983 derives, but were added by amendment in 1874.11s No
recorded explanation for this amendment exists, but the use of the
words "or territory" in a statute designed primarily to enforce the
fourteenth amendment might indicate that when Congress adopted
that amendment it understood the fourteenth to apply to territorial
as well as state action. That, of course, is not an ineluctable conclusion. Congress could have created a cause of action for deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of territorial law in the same statute
that created one for deprivations under color of state law without
assuming that the source of each set of rights was identical. Furthermore, even if an 1874 Congress did believe the fourteenth amendment regulated territorial action, that would be only persuasive, not
binding, on the federal courts.'
B. The "Special" Status of Commonwealth
Since the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1951,
there has been some belief, particularly in Puerto Rico, that commonwealth status is unique. 2 0 The United States' newest territory,
the Northern Marianas, has chosen to be denominated a commonwealth for that reason. 121 One unique feature of commonwealth
status is that the organic act is preceded by a covenant, approved by
both Congress and the people of the territory.'2 2 In a 1953 case, the
United States District Court for Puerto Rico described that commonwealth's covenant as a compact between sovereignties, unalterable
except with the consent of both the United States and Puerto
Rico. 23 The First District Court said in Mora v. Mejias that the relationship "constitutes an innovation in the history of communities
which were previously considered to be territories."' 2 4 Thus the district court concluded the fifth amendment no longer applied to Pu118. Rev. Stat. § 1979, 18 Stat. 347 (1874). See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 582-83 (1976).
119. For example, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), in upholding a section of the Judiciary Act, the Court noted that it was passed by the first Congress,
many of whose members had participated in the constitutional convention. Id. at 351. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), however, the Court, in declaring unconstitutional a provision of the same act, ignored the constitutional expertise of that Congress.
120. See, e.g., Camacho-Negron & Larson, In the Promotion of Well-Being: The Situation of P.R. Under the United States Constitution, 40 Rv. Co. AB. P.R. 1, 29-31 (1979). See
also Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953), aff'd sub nom., Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d
377 (1st Cir. 1953).
121. Covenant, supra note 112.
122. See, e.g., id.
123. Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 313 (D.P.R. 1953), affld sub nom., Mora v. Mejias,
206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953). In order to avoid confusion, both the district court and circuit
court opinions will be referred to by the single style Mora o. Mejias.
124. 113 F. Supp. at 319.
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erto Rico as it is not a possession, dependence, or territory subject to
the of Congress' plenary power. 12 That court also held the fourteenth amendment inapplicable because Puerto Rico was not a federated state within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 126 The
court concluded, however, Puerto Rico was effectively bound by the
2 7
fifth amendment "as part of the compact."'
On appeal, the First CirGuit appeared reluctant to address the politically sensitive question of commonwealth status, merely affirming
the district court's discretionary refusal to issue a temporary injunction. In contrast to the district court's seven page discussion of the
nature of commonwealth status, the court of appeals devoted only a
single paragraph to that issue. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the due process clause of the fifth amendment or that of
the fourteenth amendment was applicable. Instead, the court simply
held that every governmental authority "under the American flag"
was subject to due process limitations. 2 Thus began what could be
labeled the federal-state ambivalence. As with so many stop-gap solutions, the First Circuit's became permanent. The First Circuit began
to use this approach to resolve the merits of constitutional claims,
striking down certain territorial laws without deciding whether territorial action was to be treated as federal or state action. Courts,
therefore, did not decide which provision of the Constitution was actually being applied. In the seventies, the Supreme Court adopted
the same approach. 29
This issue is an important facet of the more fundamental question
of constitutional applicability in the territories. Focusing sharply on
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
206 F.2d at 382.

No doubt under the Organic Act of 1917, the insular government was subject to the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Under the terms of the "compact" offered to the
people of Puerto Rico and by the Joint Resolution of Congress approving the Constitution adopted by the people of Puerto Rico pursuant thereto, the government of the
newly created Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is subject to "the applicable provisions of
the constitution of the United States." That must mean that the people of Puerto Rico,
who remain United States citizens, are entitled to invoke against the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico the protection of the fundamental guaranty of due process of law, as provided in the federal Constitution. For our present purposes it is unnecessary to determine whether it is the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment or that of the Fourteenth Amendment which is applicable; the important point is that there cannot exist
under the American flag any governmental authority untrammeled by the requirements
of due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
400 U.S. 41 (1970).
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the issue of the applicability of constitutional provisions to territories
is impossible without first determining which provision is being discussed. The Court's ambivalence on the federal or state action issue
has led it to reduce all constitutional questions in the territories to
due process questions. Thus, the Court assumes it makes no difference whether the Bill of Rights is directly applicable to territories
because their actions are federal actions, or is indirectly applicable
through the fourteenth amendment because their actions are state
actions.130 Conversely, this approach assumes the results would be
the same regardless of whether the contract clause or the equal protection clause is directly applicable to territories, or indirectly applicable through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 131
3 2
These are not self-evidently valid assumptions.1

IV. THE

TRENDS AND

How

THEY EMERGED

A. The Burger Court Starts on a Downbeat
To assess the Burger Court's record on territorial issues, a brief
chronological review of the important Burger Court decisions involving the application of the United States Constitution to the territories will be undertaken. The Burger Court began its treatment of territorial issues on a downbeat by abstaining in Fornarisv. Ridge Tool
Co.' 33 The case is noteworthy, however, for the Court's first tacit acceptance of the First Circuit's either-or approach to the federal-state
action question. The case is also interesting because, viewed in light
of later cases, it demonstrates the Court's flexibility on whether the
word "state" can include a territory. Fornaris suggests that the abstention doctrine has a special application to the territories.
Fornaris involved a constitutional attack on a Puerto Rico law
that made contracts between manufacturers and dealers non-terminable by the manufacturer except for "just cause.' 3 4 The First Circuit Court of Appeals held the law unconstitutional on the ground
that, as applied to prior-existing agreements, it impaired the obligation of contract.3 5 On the face, the contract clause limits only state
130. See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 133-39, 151-57 and accompanying text.
132. See Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. Rsv.
541 (1977).
133. 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
134. DEALER'S CoNTRAcT LAW; P.R. Act No. 75 (1964). Legislative history indicates the
law was predicated upon a belief that foreign corporations used local dealers to establish a
foothold in Puerto Rico and then unfairly dropped them. The court of appeals in Fornaris
evinced some doubt about this finding. 423 F.2d at 565, 567.
135. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563, 569 (1st Cir. 1969). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10
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government, but a similar principle has been interpreted to be a part
of due process of law and thus applicable to the federal government
through the fifth amendment.13 The court of appeals held either the
fifth or fourteenth amendment due process clause must be applicable
to Puerto Rico and assumed the result would be the same in either
3 7
event.1
In reversing and invoking the abstention doctrine, the Supreme
Court noted without comment the textual basis of the court of appeal's holding. The Court noted the appeals court had found the retrospective impact of the ]Dealers Contract Law violated the due process clause of federal constitution, but did not specify whether the
fifth or the fourteenth amendment was involved. 38 While the
Fornaris case did not clearly indicate whether the Supreme Court
approved of the either-or approach, in subsequent cases the Court
has cited Fornaris for the proposition that either the fifth or the
fourteenth amendment is applicable to Puerto Rico and that, because
the effect of those amendments is the same, it is unnecessary to determine specifically which amendment applies.' 39 The Court in
Fornariswent on to hold the district court and the court of appeals
should have abstained to allow the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to
construe the "just cause" exception. The Court held abstention is
particularly appropriate in appeals from territorial courts because
territorial laws may be impregnated with cultural traditions best understood by local courts.' ° Finally, in resolving a jurisdictional issue,
the FornarisCourt held a Puerto Rico statute is not a state statute
reads in part: "No State shall . . . pass any ...
Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts. .. ."
136. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1969); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
137. The First Circuit's assumption that the contract clause and the principle embodied
in due process are for practical purposes identical is illustrative of the attitude behind the fifthfourteenth ambivalence. See supro notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
The court of appeals said in Fornaris:"We need not deal with a constitutional prohibition
against impairing the obligation of contracts, because the due process clause of the federal Constitution provides essentially the same restraint so far as retrospectivity is concerned." 423 F.2d
at 566-67 (footnotes omitted).
138. 400 U.S. at 42-43.
139. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 n.5, reh'g denied, 417
U.S. 977 (1974).
140. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
The relations of the federal courts to Puerto Rico have raised delicate problems. It is a
Spanish-speaking Commonwealth with a set of laws still impregnated with the Spanish
tradition. Federal courts, reversing Puerto Rican courts, were inclined to construe Puerto
Rican laws in the Anglo-Saxon tradition which often left little room for the overtones of
Spanish culture. Out of that experience grew a pronouncement by this Court that a Puerto Rican court should not be overruled on its construction of local law unless it could
be said to be "inescapably wrong."
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within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), which created an appeal
as of right for a party relying on a state statute held invalid by a
federal court of appeals. The Court referred to its policy of strict
statutory construction when authorizing appeals as of right to sup14
port its literal interpretation of the word "state.2 '
B. The Hemp Boat is A'Coming
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 142 involved a challenge to the Puerto Rico deodands143 statute as applied to a yacht
owner whose boat had been, without the owner's complicity or knowledge, used by a lessee to transport marijuana. A three-judge district
court held the Act invalid for failure to provide pre-seizure notice
and hearing.'4 The Supreme Court reversed. Initially, the Court held
that Puerto Rico was a state for the purpose of the Three-Judge
Court Act. The Court distinguished its contrary construction of the
word "state" in Fornaris,noting the same word can have different
meanings in different statutes depending upon the context and the
purpose of the statute. The Court said the legislative policy behind
the Three-Judge Court Act was to protect state autonomy by reducing the likelihood state statutes would be erroneously enjoined. Because Congress had manifested a desire to enhance Puerto Rico's autonomy by making Puerto Rico a commonwealth, the Court deemed
it appropriate to treat Puerto Rico as a state for the purposes of this
.4 5
Act.1
The Court agreed with the district court that there was no need to
decide whether it was the fifth or the fourteenth amendment that
was applicable, citing Fornarisfor the proposition that it was enough
that one or the other applied. In further support of this proposition,
the Court also referred to the Joint Resolution of Congress approving
the original constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico:
400 U.S. at 43.
141. 400 U.S. at 43.
142. 416 U.S. 663, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
143. The word is from the Latin, Deo dandum, "given to God." It refers to various laws
by which vehicles or other objects used in the commission of crimes are forfeited to the state.
The term refers to the original conception of the doctrine: that an animal or inanimate object
causing death or serious harm was itself guilty and had to be expatriated by forfeiture to the
monarch as the representative of the Diety. In modem times, prevention and deterrence are the
rationales used for such forfeiture statutes, but criminal intent of the owner is not a prerequisite to forfeiture. See generally Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some HistoricalPerspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEmp.L.Q.
169, 182 (1973).
144. Pearson Yacht Leasing v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (D.P.R. 1973), rev'd sub
nom., 416 U.S. 663, rehg denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
145. 416 U.S. at 669-76.
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"There cannot exist under the American flag any governmental authority untrammeled by the requirements of due process of law as
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States."1 6 While the
Court divided on the merits of the case, all the Justices seemed to
apply the Constitution exactly as if the issue had arisen in a state.14
For the majority, the seizure of property used in a crime was an "extraordinary situation" which justified the postponement of notice and
hearing. 48
The Court characterized the second issue as whether the statute
"unconsitutionally authorized the taking for government use of innocent parties' property without just compensation." 4 9 The majority
found policy and tradition justified the seizure of property where the
owner had consented to use, even though not illegal use, by the
wrongdoer.150 While the reasons espoused had no special relationship
to territories, the import of the holding was that a deodands statute
of this nature is constitutional in either a state or a territory.
C. The Case of the Alien Engineers
The Court's next foray into territorial law, Examining Board v.
Flores de Otero,15' dealt with an attack on a Puerto Rico statute
making United States citizenship a prerequisite to obtaining a license
as a civil engineer. 52 While the case produced a long and detailed
examination of territorial. law, it did little to clarify the area. In Flores de Otero, two otherwise qualified aliens brought suit, claiming the
law violated the equal protection principle. Citing Calero-Toledo, the
Court held either the fifth or the fourteenth amendment was applicable, but declined to say which one it was applying. 5 ' Because the
Court ultimately found the law unconstitutional, Flores de Otero became the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a territorial statute without specifically identifying the clause of the Consti146. Id. at 668 n.5 (quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d at 382).
147. Justice Stewart jointed in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, but agreed with
Justice Douglas' dissent that "the forfeiture of property belonging to an innocent and nonnegligent owner violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 691. Justice Douglas' only
reference to a specific clause in the Constitution was that "there was a taking of private property 'for public use' under the Fifth Amendment, applied to the States by the Fourteenth, and
compensation must be paid an innocent owner." Id. at 694. The separate concurring opinion of
Justice White, joined by Justice Powell, also dealt with the case as if it had arisen in a state. Id.
at 691.
148. Id. at 676-80.
149. Id. at 680.
150. Id. at 680-91.
151. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
152. Id. at 575.
153. Id. at 601.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss4/4

34

Laughlin: The Burger Court and the United States Territories
1984]

U.S. TERRITORIES AND BURGER COURT

tution that it offended.
The Commonwealth had offered three justifications for the law:
The first is to prevent the "uncontrolled" influx of Spanishspeaking aliens into the [engineering] field in Puerto Rico.
The second is to raise the prevailing low standard of living.
The third is to provide the client of a civil engineer an assurance of financial accountability if a building for which the engineer is responsible
collapses within 10 years of
54
construction.

Apparently assuming that the equal protection considerations would
be the same whether the Puerto Rico law was considered state action
or federal action, the Court rejected the proffered rationales and
struck down the law, relying on previous holdings invalidating state
restriction on alien employment. 155 According to the Court, the first
proffered justification was little more than an expression of a desire
to discriminate. The second two, while having aspects of legitimacy,
were not rationally addressed by the law. Indeed, the second justification was also "at odds with the Federal government's primary
power and responsbility for the regulation of immigration."' 56 In his
dissent, Justice Rehnquist objected to the Court's failure to decide
whether the fifth or fourteenth amendment was being applied. He
argued the outcome might differ depending on that initial determination, as traditionally the federal government has more control over
57
aliens than do the states.

As in the preceding cases, the Court in Flores de Otero considered
a procedural question that turned on whether the word "state" could
be read to include a territory. Here the issue was whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) creates jurisdiction, without regard to amount in contro-versy, over actions for deprivation of rights under color of territorial
law. In other words, the question was whether the word "state" in 18
U.S.C. § 1343(3) included territories.'518 After a lengthy review of the
154. Id. at 605.
155. Id. at 601-06.
156. Id. at 605.
157. Id. at 608-09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) expressly creates a cause of action for deprivation of rights
under color of the law of a territory. See supra note 117. The jurisdictional statute, however, 28
U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982), which was originally a part of the same statute as § 1983, makes no

explicit reference to territories:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person ...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitu-
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history of the section and of Puerto Rico's relationship to the Union,
the Court concluded the word "state" as used in § 1343(3), did include territories. 159 The Court rejected an abstention claim, noting
that in Flores de Otero, unlike in Fornaris,there was no ambiguity in
the statute that would require resolution by a local court. 16 0
D. Unequal Application of Federal Law
Califano v. Gautier Torres' was potentially the most significant
of the Burger Court's territorial cases, but the Court's 7-2 per curiam
opinion skirted the most important issues. The Gautier Torres plaintiffs, while residents of various states, all received benefits under the
Federal Supplementary Security Income (SSI) Act. After the plaintiffs moved to Puerto Rico, the benefits were discontinued because
the territories were explicitly excluded from the coverage of the
Act. "6' 2 The plaintiffs challenged this exclusion as a violation both of
their right to travel and of the equal protection clause. The district
court found for plaintiffs on their right to travel claim, 63 but the Supreme Court reversed.
Relying on Shapiro v. Thompson"" and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County'6 5 the district court held the denial of state benefits to new state residents unconstitutionally burdened the right to
travel. The Supreme Court stated, however, that the district court
had altogether transposed the principle of those cases. The Court
noted the travelers in Shapiro and Maricopa County had sought
equal benefits to those of longer term residents, while the plaintiffs in
Gautier Torres sought greater benefits than other Puerto Rico residents. The Supreme Court said, without explanation, that the reasoning of the district court would apply "with equal force"' 66 to a
situation where a citizen moved to a different state which afforded
lesser welfare benefits than the one he had left. The Court reasoned
tion of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
159. 426 U.S. at 580-97.
160. Id. at 597-98. No mention was made of any special applicability of the abstention
doctrine to cases involving territorial law.
161. 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). Puerto Ricans were still eligible for benefits under the Old
Age Assistance Act, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Disabled and Aid to the Aged, Blind and
Disabled Acts which SSI replaced as to residents of the States. The benefits under SSI, however, were significantly higher. Id.
163. The district court's opinion was unreported. 435 U.S. at 3 n.5.
164. 392 U.S. 618 (1969).
165. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
166. 435 U.S. at 4.
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that because the federal system could not tolerate a requirement that
states equalize benefits in order to remove all potential impediments
to travel, plaintiffs' right-to-travel claim must similarly fail. As for
the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the Court cursorily disposed of
it in a footnote. Without elaboration, the Court merely stated that
Puerto Rico's relationship to the union is unique and that Congress
16 7
may treat Puerto Rico differently.
E. South of the Intermediate Border
Terrol Torres v.Puerto Rico6" " produced the most extended Burger Court discussion on the issue of constitutional application in the
territories. Torres was convicted of marijuana possession. The conviction was based upon evidence obtained in a search of his luggage at
the San Juan airport after he had arrived on a flight from Miami.
The search was made without probable cause and was justified on the
basis of a Puerto Rico statute authorizing airport searches on suspicion. 6"9 The entire Court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but
divided sharply on the basis for this finding. The majority reviewed
the Insular Cases and Latter Insular Cases and proceeded on the
17 0
assumption that those cases stated the rule of the instant case.
The majority went on to say that a legislative determination
favoring constitutional application to a territory is entitled to great
weight "because the limitation on the application of the Constitution
in unincorporated territories is based in part on the need to preserve
Congress' ability to govern such possessions, and may be overruled by
Congress.' 7' Noting that Puerto Rico has had a fourth amendment
equivalent in its law by congressional mandate since 1917, the Court
held fourth amendment principles applicable and reversed Torres'
conviction. The Court again declined to decide whether due process
was applicable to Puerto Rico through the fourth amendment or
through the fourteenth amendment. 2
167.
168.

Id. at 3 n.4.
442 U.S. 465 (1979).

169. P.R. LAWS ANN.tit. 25, § 1051 (1979) provides:
The Police of Puerto Rico is [sic] hereby empowered and authorized to inspect the luggage, packages, bundles, and bags of passengers and crew who land in the airports and
piers of Puerto Rico arriving from the United States; to examine cargo brought into the
country, and to detain, question, and search those persons whom the Police have ground
to suspect of illegally carrying firearms, explosives, narcotics, depressants or stimulants
or similar substances.
442 U.S.
170.
171.
172.

at 466 n.1 (emphasis added).
442 U.S. at 468-69.
Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
Id. at 470-71.
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The Court also rejected Puerto Rico's argument that its territorial
boundaries constitute an "intermediate border" justifying extraordinary search powers in the nature of border searches. To this contention, the Court simple responded that "Puerto Rico is not unique because it is an island.' 17 "1 Four Justices separately concurred in an
opinion by Justice Brennan, arguing the Insular Cases should no
longer be authority for questioning the application of the Bill of
Rights to Puerto Rico. 7
F. Less Favorable Treatment Under Federal Law
In Harris v. Rosario,175 the Court upheld Congress' decision to
provide Puerto Rico with a reduced benefits schedule under the Aid
for Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 6 The Court cited
Califano Gautier Torres177 for the proposition that Congress may
treat a territory differently from a state so long as its actions have a
"rational basis" and are not invidious. The alleged rational bases
were the same ones advanced to justify Puerto Rico's exclusion from
the SSI program: (a) Puerto Ricans are not subject to Federal Income
Tax; (b) exclusion saves the federal government expense; and, (c) inclusion might disrupt Puerto Rico's economy. The majority accepted
these justifications without examining either their logic or their factual foundations.
Three Justices dissented. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion 78
argued that Gautier Torres did not establish the proposition for
which it was cited in Rosario. Justice Marshall also argued that
neither case had given adequate consideration to the constitutional
issues involved. Finally, Justice Marshall questioned the self-evident
79
rationality of the justifications advanced.
G. The Deceased Legislator
The Court again addressed the Constitution's application to Puerto Rico in the 1982 case of Rivera-Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party.8 0 Rivera-Rodriguez involved a Puerto Rico statute
which allowed the political party of a deceased legislator to hold a
members-only primary to name the person to serve out the dece173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 472-74.
Id. at 474-75 (Brennan, J., concurring).
446 U.S. 651 (1980).
Id. at 651-52; 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-625 (1982).
435 U.S. 1 (1978).
446 U.S. at 652.
Id.
457 U.S. 1 (1982).
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dent's term. A unanimous Court upheld the statute against claims by
non-party members that the process denied them the right to vote
and equal protection of the law.
Citing Gautier Torres, the Court held "the fundamental protections of the United States Constitution extend to the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico."1 1 The Court then relied on Flores de Otero and
Calero-Toledo to establish that "[i]n particular . . . Puerto Rico is
subject to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. 18s 2 The Court then concluded that "the voting
rights of Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected to the
same extent as those of all other citizens of the United States."1 1 3 In
a footnote, the Court stated that it had never been "necessary to resolve the precise question"18 4 of whether the fifth or the fourteenth
amendment was applicable.
On the merits, the Court relied upon cases upholding similar procedures in states. The Court noted it had "rejected claims that the
Constitution compels a fixed method of choosing state or local officers or representatives. 1 81 5 According to the Court, the Constitution
did not confer a specific right to the franchise. Instead, only the right
to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens was
assured. 8 6 The seventeenth amendment, the Court noted, has been
construed to permit the interim appointment of United States Senators.18 7 The Court reasoned that a state has similar latitude in filling
its legislative vacancies. The Court concluded nothing in the Federal
Constitution imposed "greater constraints on the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico."1 8 8 With respect to delegating the appointment power
to a political party, the Court found the legislative purpose of preserving continuity of party representation was not unreasonable. 8"
V. WHAT THE COURT SAYS IT

Is DOING

These Supreme Court decisions have had profound ramifications
for the territories, yet the position of the Burger Court on the
broader issues tends to be obscure. In Terrol Torres, 90 which con181. Id. at 7. The Court followed this quote with a "cf." cite to Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138
182.
183.
184.
185.

(1904), suggesting an evolution of the applicable doctrine.
457 U.S. at 7.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 7-8 n.6 (emphasis added).
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).

186. Id. at 9-10.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 13.
442 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1979).
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tained the most extended discussion of the law of constitutional ap9 applicability, the majority cited the Insular Cases'9' and Balzac"'
provingly, indicating these cases still have validity. In addition, the
majority opinion was consistent with the King rule, focusing upon
the feasibility of applying a particular provision in a particular situation.1 93 The language in the majority opinion explained the significance the Court attached to Congress having imposed search and
seizure restrictions on :Puerto Rico for many years and recognized
that those restrictions had apparently worked. 94 This emphasis on
the proven suitability for Puerto Rico of fourth amendment doctrine
seems to evidence an approach similar to that advocated by King.
The King approach was also evident in the Court's handling of
Puerto Rico's alternative argument in Terrol Torres that Puerto
Rico's boundaries constituted an "intermediate border" and that it
therefore should have search power at its airport equivalent to those
of the United States Border Patrol. Puerto Rico based this argument
on its "unique political status" and the fact its borders as an island
are international to all except the United States.'95 The Court characterized this argument as a proposal for a "novel exception to the
normal Fourth Amendment requirements" and rejected it.'"6
Puerto Rico's "intermediate border" argument was viewed as a request for exemption from a constitutional rule on the ground that its
application to the territory would be impractical or anomalous. Using
the King doctrine, the Court would reject that request if not persuaded Puerto Rico's sitaution was sufficiently different from that of
a state to warrant a special constitutional rule. The Terrol Torres
Court said Puerto Rico is not unique simply because it is an island.
Hawaii is composed of islands, Alaska's borders are entirely discontiguous to the rest of the United States, over half the states have
international boundaries and other states have international airports.
Customs and immigration in Puerto Rico are handled by federal officials as they are in the states. Applying the King test, the Court
could have concluded, as it did in Terrol Torres, that there simply
was not sufficient evidence to justify a finding that the application of
the fourth amendment to Puerto Rican airport searches would be impractical or anomalous.
191. See supra notes 36-66 and accompanying text.
192. 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
193. See Laughlin, supra note 12, at 386.
194. "Both Congress' implicit determinations in this respect and long experience establish
that the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on searches and seizure may be applied to Puerto
Rico without danger to national interests or risk of unfairness." 442 U.S. at 470.
195. Id. at 472.
196. Id.
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Four concurring Justices in Terrol Torres, however, expressed a
position with stronger overtones of ex proprio vigore. Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, Stewart and Blackmun, wrote specifically
for the purpose of questioning the applicability of the Insular Cases
and the Latter Insular Cases to the case at bar:
Whatever the validity of the old cases such as Downes v. Bidwell, Dorr v. United States and Balzac v. Porto Rico, in the
particular historical context in which they were decided, those
cases are clearly not authority for questioning the application
of the Fourth Amendment - or any other provision of the
Bill of Rights - to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the
1970's.197
Justice Brennan, the only member of the Reid v. Covert Court still
on the bench, quoted Justice Black's plurality opinion in which he
had joined:
Neither the [Insular] cases nor their reasoning should be
given any further expansion. The concept that the Bill of
Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary
government are inoperative when they become inconvenient
or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous
doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of
a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our
government. 198
The quote seemed inapposite to the Terrol Torres situation. Applying Downes, Dorr and Balzac 99 to Terrol Torres was hardly an expansion of the Insular doctrine. The basic issue of the application of
the Constitution to a United States territory was identical. Covert,
the source of the quote, dealt with the application of the Constitution
on United States military bases in foreign countries and thus at least
superficially presented a different fact pattern. Applying the Insular
Cases in this situation could constitute an "expansion" of the doctrine in a sense even though, as noted, the analogy was close and
Justice Black's effort to distinguish the Insular Cases was
20 0
unconvincing.
The very weakness of Justice Black's effort to distinguish the Insular Cases in Covert highlighted his obvious predilection for the ex
proprio vigore position. The unconvincing nature of the proffered
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 476 (quoting Covert, 354 U.S. at 14).
Downes, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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distinction suggested Black's quarrel was with the doctrine itself and
not the particular application. °' By the same token, Justice Brennan's rejection in Terrol Torres of the applicability of the Insular
Cases in the exact context in which they originally arose, while at the
same time concurring in the holding that the fourth amendment is
fully applicable in Puerto Rico, sounds even more of ex proprio
vigore. Justice Marshall's characterization of the Terrol Torres concurrence in his Rosario dissent supports that interpretation: "At least
four Members of this Court are of the view that all provisions of the
'20 2
Bill of Rights apply to 'Puerto Rico.
A. JudicialReview of TerritorialLaws
The remaining Burger Court cases dealing with territorial law are
not inconsistent with the King approach, although they provide less
evidence of its use. In each case, the Court always reached a result
that would have been consistent with either the King approach or ex
proprio vigore. In Calero-Toledo03 and Rivera-Rodriguez, 2 1 a King
analysis would have been superfluous because both the Puerto Rico
deodands law and the interim elections law were upheld under constitutional standards applicable in the states.
The invocation of the abstention doctrine in Fornaris was also
consistent with the King approach. In arguing for the special applicability of the doctrine to cases involving territorial law, the Court alluded to considerations reminiscent of those that motivated the
Court in King and Justice Harlan in Covert. Citing Puerto Rico's
unique Spanish legal tradition and culture, the FornarisCourt stated
that "a Puerto Rican court should not be overruled on its construction of local law unless it could be said to be 'inescapably wrong.' "205
Abstention can be seen as a variant of the King approach, whereby
the territory is given every opportunity to reconcile its law with the
Constitution and the Court restrains its hand to avoid wherever possible invalidation of laws deemed especially appropriate to a
territory.
The Fornarisfacts presented a pertinent King-like issue. Puerto
Rico had defended the Dealer Contract law based on an alleged practice peculiar to territories. Puerto Rico claimed mainland manufacturers made a practice of contracting with locals to operate dealer201. This author has already noted Justice Black's affinity with the earlier advocates of
ex proprio vigore. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
202. 446 U.S. at 653-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
204. 457 U.S. 1 (1982). See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
205. 400 U.S. at 42-43 (citing Bonet v. Texas Co., 308 U.S. 463, 471 (1940)).
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ships and then, when the locals had successfully opened up a market,
the manufacturers took over the dealerships. While the practice is
not unknown in the states, it may have a special dimension in territories. Because of cultural differences it is especially advantageous for
new companies coming to a territory to work through local people to
gain acceptance. Due to their relatively limited business experience
and bargaining power, territorials may be less able to protect themselves by contract against exploitation of their personal good will.
Under the King rule, a court would consider whether there might be
a significant difference to the problem in Puerto Rico. If so, a different contract clause application might be desirable. While it is not
certain what the outcome would be if a court developed the kind of
record the King rule requires, the case did suggest the type of concern that could justify a different constitutional application in a
territory.
In Flores de Otero,206 where the territory attempted to restrict
civil engineering licenses to United States citizens, the special concern that all territories have with respect to immigration matters was
evident. Puerto Rico's alien laws are typical of those in other territories and not especially severe. By comparison, American Samoa attempts to regulate immigration even of non-Samoan United States
citizens and gives persons of Samoan extraction preference over all
others in almost all occupations. These laws reflect the prevalent
opinion in territories that the islands belong to the indigenous people
and that their legislatures should protect them against excessive intrusion by outsiders, including United States citizens. The Supreme
Court has made it clear a state cannot close its borders to sister
states or prefer old residents over new.207 King, however, indicates
that, among the territories, their unique situations might justify a
different constitutional role.
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Flores de Otero did consider Puerto Rico's proffered justifications, but gave them short shrift.20 8
These justifications, however, were not clearly treated as claims of
territorial uniqueness.2 0 9 Explicit reliance on the King approach
might have framed the issues more precisely.
The Court's record on territorial legislation is ambigious. It can be
read as largely consistent with a King approach, but the results are
also consistent with ex proprio vigore. In the cases where -such legislation is upheld, the opinions indicate the same result would have
206.
207.
208.
209.

426 U.S. 572 (1976). See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Zobel v. Alaska, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
426 U.S. at 605-06.
Id.
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been reached in a state. Where the legislation was struck down, passing attention was given to claims of territorial uniqueness, but they
did not carry the day.
B. Federal Legislation Affecting Territories
If territorials are disturbed by the possibility that the Court gives
insufficient consideration to cultural and other differences between
their territory and the United States mainland when evaluating territorial legislation, they are even more disturbed by the extreme deference given congressional legislation which allegedly discriminates
against territories. In evaluating such federal legislation affecting territories, the Court has displayed a deference far beyond that indicated by King. The deferential position evolved in Gautier Torres
and in Harris v. Rosario. In Gautier Torres, the plaintiffs challenged
congressional action excluding Puerto Rico from the Federal Supplementary Security Income program. 2 10 The challenge was on two
grounds. First, because the plaintiffs had previously lived in the
states, they claimed the exclusion violated their right to travel by penalizing them for moving to Puerto Rico.2 1 ' Second, the plaintiffs argued the exclusion of Puerto Rico from a program available in the
states and the District of Columbia violated the fifth amendment
equal protection clause by arbitrarily discriminating against Ameri212
can citizens on the basis of residence.
The Supreme Court addressed only the first argument in the main
body of its opinion.2 13 In the lower court, the plaintiffs successfully
relied on Shapiro v. Thompson2 1 4 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County"26 for the proposition that the denial of benefits due to
an interstate move can constitute an unconstitutional burden on the
right to travel. Yet the Supreme Court claimed the District Court of
Puerto Rico had transposed the proposition for which Shapiro and
Memorial Hospital stood. 16 Those cases, the Court noted, required
that new residents of a state be accorded benefits equivalent to those
of old residents. In contrast, the plaintiffs' theory, as the Court saw
it, required that new residents of Puerto Rico receive greater benefits
210. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1982).
211. The district court did not reach the equal protection claim, finding the statute invalid on right to travel grounds. 435 U.S. at 3. This may explain, although not justify, the Supreme Court's summary disposition of the serious equal protection issue. For a discussion of
Gautier Torres, see supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text.
212. 435 U.S. at 3 n.4.
213. Id. at 4.
214. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
215. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
216. 435 U.S. at 4.
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than lifelong residents. 17
The Court then made the dubious and unexplained assertion that
the plaintiffs' argument would apply "with equal force" to benefits
provided by states. 218 That questionable leap allowed the Court to
hypothesize that a victory for the plaintiffs in Gautier Torres would
lead to a constitutional requirement that states continue to pay benefits to persons who had moved away. The implications of such a rule,
according to the Court, in other areas of substantive law would work
to destroy each state's independent power to enact laws which could
be uniformly applied to all its residents. 1 9
The Court's effort to discredit the district court's opinion was either extremely misguided or disingenuous. Because the plaintiffs
were attacking a federal law, where Congress controls the benefits
paid at both ends of the trip, a decision for the plaintiffs could easily
be distinguished in any subsequent case challenging a disparity between programs offered by two states. 22 0 A state cannot control what
other states do. Accordingly, a state cannot be held responsible for
discrepancies between the benefits it affords and those afforded by
sister states. Even if some cognizable burden on the right to travel
were involved, the "compelling interest" is the federal system itself
and the disparity could be justified as the price of state autonomy.
Thus the Court disposed of a serious right to travel claim by an
untenable analogy to a hypothetical case. Having rejected the argument upon which the plaintiffs won below, the Court brushed aside
the plaintiffs' equal protection claim in a footnote, a footnote upon
which the Rosario opinion would later be grounded:
The complaint had also relied on the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in
attacking the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the SSI program.
Acceptance of that claim would have meant that all otherwise
qualified persons in Puerto Rico are entitled to SSI benefits,
not just those who received such benefits before moving to
Puerto Rico. But the District Court apparently acknowledged
217. The Court's suggestion that Gautier Torres was seeking preferential treatment over
longer term residents was clearly more polemic than analysis. Torres equal protection argument
would have been applicable to all Puerto Rican residents and it was the Court that chose to
relegate that argument to a footnote. Had the Court decided for Torres on the right to travel
argument alone, it need not have held that SSI benefits be paid only to those persons who had
moved to Puerto Rico.
218. 435 U.S. at 4.
219. Id. at 4-5.
220. The Court also cited Mathews v. De Casto, 429 U.S. 181 (1971), for the proposition
that welfare legislation carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. 435 U.S. at 5. Whether
this represents a qualification of the Court's minimal scrutiny of discrimination against territories remains to be seen.
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that Congress has the power to treat Puerto Rico differently,
and that every federal program does not have to be extended
to it. Puerto Rico has a relationship to the United States
"that has no parallel in our history." 2 2'
The Court did not suggest what limits, if any, exist on Congress'
power to treat territories differently. It did not discuss equal protection doctrine, nor did it set forth any standard by which disparate
treatment of territories should be judged. Nevertheless, in Harris v.
Rosario,2 2 the Court relied on Gautier Torres, extrapolating from it
the proposition that acting under the territorial clause Congress
"may treat Puerto Rico differently so long as there is a rational basis
for its actions."223 The same reasons were advanced in Rosario for
providing reduced AFDC benefits for Puerto Ricans as had been used
for excluding them from the SSI program. The Court simply cited
Gautier Torres as authority "that [these reasons] suffice to form a
rational basis for the challenged statutory classification."2 2 4 The
Court had not discussed these justifications in Gautier Torres but
had merely noted them. Accordingly, by simply following Gautier
Torres, the Rosario Court avoided any scrutiny of the rationales in
either case.
C. A Different Rule for Territories
A brief examination of the right to travel and equal protection
issues in Gautier Torres and Rosario makes it clear the Court would
not so cavalierly approve disparate treatment of a state.2 2 5 In Gautier
Torres, the Court "assume[d] that there is [a] virtually unqualified
constitutional right to travel between Puerto Rico and any of the 50
States of the Union. 22 6 Despite the Court's attempt to distinguish
221. 435 U.S. at 3 n.4 (quoting Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596).
222. 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
223. Id. at 651-52 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 652.
225. Cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (Each state must be admitted on an
equal footing with every other state.).
226. 435 U.S. at 4 n.6. The Court could have discussed the point at greater length, for the
source and nature of the right to travel vary depending upon whether the travel is interstate,
intrastate or international. Compare the following cases: United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966) (right to interstate travel protected by interstate commerce clause and implicit in the
nature of the federal union); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (right to interstate
travel protected by commerce clause of fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities
clause); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to international travel protected by fifth amendment due process); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F.
Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) (right to
intrastate travel may be protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (article IV privileges and
immunities clause invalidates discriminatory license fees for out-of-state shrimper). The scope
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Shapiro and Maricopa County, those cases stand for the proposition
that a legislative policy which imposes an economic penalty on an
interstate move does, unless justified, amount to an infringement of
the right to travel.2 21 If the federal government sets the benefits at
both ends of the trip and chooses a policy that pays less at one end
than at the other, it should provide a compelling justification for the
resultant burden on travel.2 28
Most cases dealing with the right to interstate travel have involved claimed infringement by either states or individuals. 22 9 Alleged federal infringements have typically been of the right to travel
internationally. 2 0 This in itself may be testimony to the fact Congress is generally careful not to discriminate on a geographic basis
within the states. Cases which base the right of interstate travel on
the commerce clause 231 do not provide a check on federal legislation
because the commerce clause represents a source, not a limit, of federal power. The Court has said, however, that the right to travel is
also based on due process, is inherent in the nature of the federal
system, and is "secured against interference from any source
whatever, whether governmental or private."2 32 Because the right is
fundamental, it cannot be abridged unless necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest.2 3 3
In the context of the right to travel, the compelling interest test
does not always entail "fatal-in-fact" scrutiny. For example, states
have been allowed to maintain some distinctions between residents
and non-residents. These distinctions survive even though their enforcement indirectly discourages travel by imposing hardships on new
residents. 3 4
Federal laws with non-uniform geographic impact have also surof the right to travel as applied to the territories may eventually have to be decided in the

context of territorial efforts to restrict immigration of American citizens. See infra notes 275-78
and accompanying text.
227. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974). See also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972).
228. See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (state infringement); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (individual infringement).
230. See, e.g., Aptheker, v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
231. E.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
232. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759-60 n.17 (1966). See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
233. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
234. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (one year durational residency requirement for divorce proceedings upheld); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970)
(one year durational residency requirement for in-state tuition upheld in summary affirmance),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971). Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (statute creating irrebuttable presumption of non-residence for tuition purposes violates due process).
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vived constitutional challenge. Except in the area of taxation, the
Constitution has no explicit requirement of geographic uniformity of
laws.235 Unequal effects are sometimes the result of either a coverage
formula, as in the case of the Voting Right Act,23 6 or inherent in the
nature of a specific endeavor, as in the case of a reclamation dam
which can directly serve only a limited area.2 37 Because the Court has
abandoned its former presumption against closed classifications, 3 8 an
explicit exclusion of a state from a federal program is theoretically
possible if adequate justification is provided.
As in many state cases, Gautier Torres presented a merger of focus between the right to travel and the equal protection arguments.
For example, when a state denies a benefit to a new resident on the
basis of an allegedly unjustifiable durational residency test, the law
may be attacked either as a burden on the right to travel or as a
denial of equal protection because it discriminates between new and
old residents. As noted, to overcome the right to travel challenge, a
compelling state interest would be shown. Likewise, to overcome the
equal protection challenge the state's justification must also be compelling23 9 because the classification affects the right to travel, a fundamental right. As some laws that burden the right to travel survive
both kinds of constitutional attack, it is clear that, under either right
to travel or equal protection analysis, the compelling interest test is
not always applied in the "fatal-in-fact" mode.2 40 The most recent
cases suggest a balancing of the traveler's "penalized" interests
against the adequacy of the state's justification for the
classification.2 4 '
The Court has said that budgetary reasons alone will not justify a
235. The only explicit constitutional commands for uniform geographic applicability of
federal laws relate to taxes, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and equal sufferage in the Senate. Id.
art. V. Case law, however, has established the "equal footing" principle, requiring that new
states must be admitted on an equal footing with existing states. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S.
559 (1911) (Congress cannot condition admission to union on requirement that state capital be
located in a specific place because right to choose seat of government is a traditional aspect of
state sovereignty).
236. See South Carolina v. Eatzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
237. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
238. New Orleans v. Dukes, 4-27 U.S. 297 (1976) overruling Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957).
239. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
240. Justice Brennan has noted that strict scrutiny is sometimes "strict in theory but
fatal in fact," but that in other contexts it can be "strict and searching" while not necessarily
fatal. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (footnote omitted) (quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). See also Laughlin, supra note 12, at 377-78.
241. Compare Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 257-59 with Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-09 (1975).
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significant burden on the right to travel.2 42 That alone would eliminate the first two justifications advanced for granting lower benefits
to Puerto Rico residents under federal welfare programs. Yet those
justifications were weak and self-serving in any event. While the
Court has held budgetary considerations can justify somewhat arbitrary cut-offs on welfare payments, 243 it is impossible to believe the
Court would allow Congress to reduce welfare expenditures by randomly eliminating several states from a generally applicable federal
welfare program.2 44 To say that Congress saves money by eliminating
a territory from a program or by paying it reduced benefits is a truism. To allow that alone to serve as justification for disparate treatment, however, is to justify any discrimination.
The argument that Puerto Ricans are not entitled to SSI benefits
because they do not pay federal income and social security taxes is
bootstrapping because Congress itself chooses to exempt them from
those taxes. Furthermore, the exemption is based upon a congressional policy of-leaving the revenue to the territorial government. Puerto Ricans do pay taxes, but for administrative convenience their
tax dollars do not leave Puerto Rico.
Of the three rationales advanced by the government for disparate
treatment of Puerto Rico, the most intriguing was the idea that the
benefits would disrupt the Puerto Rican economy. The argument was
not developed, but merely stated in Gautier Torres and Rosario. It
has been argued from time to time that the indiscriminate extention
of feaeral spending programs to territories has had undesirable effects on the territories' economy or social structure. 245 Because of
small cash incomes in the territories, benefits may be out of scale
there and have a disproportionate impact. More specifically, because
benefits of an amount equal to those paid in a state would be larger
in proportion to other income possibilities in a territory, there might
be an incentive to remain on or become eligible for the programs.
Moreover, some contend that benefits may disrupt a functional social
system. For example, subsidizing the construction of facilities for the
aged might cause some territorial residents to abandon customs by
which elderly people are given care and attention in the homes of
242.
243.
244.

Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975).
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), upheld a Maryland limitation of AFDC

payments to $250 per family regardless of size. The majority found a rational basis in the argument that allowing unlimited AFDC would discriminate against working poor with large families and discourage employment. Unlike regional discrimination, the Maryland program allowed
all families to participate subject to the same limitation.
245. The argument has gained publicity in connection with the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands. See generally D. Nvi.N, THE AmmcAN TouCH IN MICRONESIA (1977).
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children, relatives, friends or volunteers.
Similar arguments, of course, are made against welfare programs
in the states. If a state had been excluded, the "strict and searching"
scrutiny required by the right to trayel or equal protection doctrine
would require a showing that conditions in the excluded state are
sufficiently unique that the impact of the welfare program was qualitatively different there than in other states. Likewise, under the King
doctrine, in order to justify special constitutional treatment for a territory it would be necessary to demonstrate that conditions in a territory differ in kind rather than in degree from those prevailing in
states.24 6
Although Rosario squarely raised the equal protection argument
the Court had brushed aside in Gautier Torres, the Court treated the
equal protection issue as having been resolved by Gautier Torres.
From a footnote in Gautier Torres, the Court extracted the proposition that Congress may treat Puerto Rico differently and, from its
right to travel discussion, extrapolated the rule that such disparate
treatment need only be justified by a rational basis. As the dissent
pointed out, no such rule was either explicitly stated or clearly implied in Gautier Torres24 7 and, therefore, Rosario can be seen as a
further expansion of the constitutional latitude given Congress in
dealing with the territories.
As in Gautier Torres, the Rosario Court accepted without scrutiny or proof the proffered justifications for the classification. Though
the Rosario Court avowedly adopted a rational basis standard for
testing discrimination against territories, Justice Marshall's dissent
questioned even the rationality of the justifications advanced:
[R]eliance on the fear of disrupting the Puerto Rican economy
implies that Congress intended to preserve or even strengthen
the comparative economic position of the States vis-h-vis Puerto Rico. Under this theory, those geographic units of the
country which have the strongest economies presumably
would get the most financial aid from the Federal Government since those units would be the least likely to be "disrupted." Such an approach to a financial assistance program
246. Under the King rule, enforcement of a provision of the Constitution in a territory
should not be deemed impractical or anomalous for reasons that would be equally applicable to
a state. Laughlin, supra note 12, at 376-81. For example, it could not be argued that the fourth
amendment and its exclusionary rule are impractical in a territory because they sometimes
allow guilty parties to escape justice. Such a flaw is fatally universal. Territories should be
expected to tolerate as much inconvenience in pursuit of constitutional values as do states. In
order to make out a case for constitutional exemption, there should be a showing that the
impact of a provision is qualitatively different in a territory. Laughlin, supra note 12, at 379.
247. 446 U.S. at 654-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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is not so clearly rational as the Court suggests. . . . Nor does
appellant refer to any evidence in the record supporting the
notion that
such a speculative fear of economic disruption is
2 48
warranted.
It is difficult to believe the Court would approve of Congress excluding a state from a federal benefits program, or giving it reduced benefits, on the meager rationales advanced in Gautier Torres and Rosario. Moreover, it is impossible to believe that, had a state been
excluded, the Court would simply have accepted the mere statement
of those justifications without any proof of their validity or even a
detailed explanation of their logic. In stating the rule that Congress
may treat a territory differently from states so long as it has a rational basis for doing so and then applying the lowest level of rational
basis scrutiny, the Burger Court certainly has gone beyond the degree
of constitutional latitude contemplated by the original Insular Cases,
as well as Covert and King.
In Rosario, Justice Marshall called the Court's attention to its
strict application of the Constitution to Puerto Rico in Terrol Torres,
Calero-Toledo and Flores de Otero, suggesting inconsistency between
those cases and Rosario. 9 Indeed the Court did seem to trace a
crooked path in the recent cases. Comparing the Court's imposition
of strict constitutional standards in Calero-Toledo, Flores de Otero
and Terrol Torres with the vague, but certainly relaxed, standards
applied in Gautier Torres and Rosario, it is evident that for constitutional purposes the Court treats congressional territorial legislation
differently from territorial government action. Justice Marshall is
correct in perceiving that this double standard is unjustified.
VI. TERRITORIES AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF

DEFERENTIAL REVIEW

Congressional intent has always played a major role in territorial
law. Under the short-lived extension doctrine, congressional intent
was virtually the sum and substance of constitutional application.
While the incorporation doctrine began as a juxtaposition to the extention theory, it later became clear congressional intent played an
important role under the incorporation approach as well. Still, the
father of the incorporation doctrine, Justice Edward Douglass White,
separately concurred in Downes because he rejected the concept that
the constitutional rights of territorials should be left to the will of
248. Id. at 656 (footnote omitted).
249. Id. at 653-54.
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Congress.2 5 0
Some deference to congressional intent makes sense in the territorial context. In Terrol Torres, congressional experience in imposing
fourth amendment type restrictions on Puerto Rico demonstrated
that the fourth amendment itself could work there, a factor the Court
quite correctly noted. Yet Rosario is deference to Congress run wild.
The kind of minimal rational basis scrutiny applied in Rosario, where
any set of circumstances that can be hypothesized will justify singling
out territorials for less favorable treatment under federal law,25 1
leaves the territories at the mercy of a Congress in which they have
no vote.
In the language of the famous Carolene Products footnote, territorials are in the most. literal sense "discrete and insular minorities. 2 52 Theirs is most certainly a "special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities."2 5 3 The special condition is
their lack of any voting representation in the United States Congress.
If a dual standard is justified, the Court has turned it upside down.
Local legislatures, responsible to the local residents and most aware
of the local cultural system, should be accorded the most deference.
A removed Congress under the temptation, in time of budgetary or
other stresses, to give the short end to the non-voting should, if any
distinctions are made, be held to the higher constitutional standard.
In part, the problem arises from the Court's historical division
over the basic standard of constitutional applicability in territories. A
majority seems to have followed the Insular Cases, with a strong presumption in favor of constitutional applicability where territorial legislation is concerned, but with extreme deference toward congres250. 182 U.S. at 292 (White. J., concurring).
251. At the rational basis level of equal protection scrutiny, the Supreme Court has utilized at least two standards. See generally 1 DORSEN, BENDER, NEUBORNE & LAW, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 336-41 (4th ed. 1979). One line of cases, traced from F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), requires the legislation have a "fair
and substantial" relationship to the relevant governmental purpose. The newer concept of intermediate scrutiny additionally requires the governmental purpose be "important." See Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The more deferential rational basis standard, traceable to Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), permits invalidations only where the law is
without any reasonable basis and thus purely arbitrary. Under this standard, the law may be
upheld without a proven factual basis "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it." Id. at 78 (emphasis added). This test almost invariably leads to an acceptance of the legislative classification. If Gautier Torres and Rosario have in fact adopted this
standard, congressional discrimination against a territory qua territory would offend equal protection only if no sane person could accept the proffered justifications. See Cohen,
Trancendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 819 (1935).
252. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
253. Id.
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sional action. That majority, however, is a tenuous one. 154
Quite possibly, the Justices are divided by philosophical differences in this area, as they are in so many others. It is also likely,
however, that unnecessary division and erratic results are the product
of the Court's failure to carefully analyze the constitutional law issues. By failing to sort out doctrinal questions, the Court has not adequately prepared itself for the necessary policy choices. This problem may also be at the root of the Court's refusal to come to grips
with the issue of whether territorial action is state or federal action
for constitutional purposes.
A. Is TerritorialAction Federal or State Action?
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Mora v. Mejias, 255 seeking
to avoid an unnecessary conflict with the District Court for Puerto
Rico over the nature of Commonwealth status, proclaimed that either
the due process clause of the fifth amendment or that of the fourteenth amendment bound the Puerto Rico legislature, but declined to
decide which one. The court did not reach the constitutional merits,
but in subsequent cases the First Circuit used the same approach to
invalidate Puerto Rico laws without deciding which clause they violated.2 6 Despite the inauspicious origin of this either-or approach,
the Supreme Court in a footnote in Fornaris,257 acknowledged without comment the First Circuit's use of it. Moreover, the Court has
2 58
since used the approach itself, citing Fornarisas authority.
254. Not only have Justices Brennan and Marshall exhibited a preference for something
closer to ex propriovigore, but Justice Blackmun has joined them in the last two of their three
divergences from the majority. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 652 (1980); Terrol Torres v.
Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1979); Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978). Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's separate opinions in Terrol Torres and Rosario. This is
significant because Justice Brennan wrote the opinion in Calero-Toledo. Now retired Justice
Stewart joined the call for abandonment of the Insular Cases in the Terrol Torres dissent,
although he went back with the majority in Rosario. On the other side, Justice Rehnquist has
indicated he would give greater deference to territorial legislation impinging on individual
rights than would either the majority or the ex proprio vigore wing. Examining Bd. v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 609-09 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This means that only Justices
Burger, Powell and White have consistently joined the majority opinions in the recent territo-

rial cases.
255. 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953).
256. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d at 566-67; Colon-Rosich v. Puerto Rico, 256
F.2d 393, 397 (lst Cir. 1958); Stagg, Mather & Hough v. Descartes, 244 F.2d 578, 583 (1st Cir.
1958).
257. 400 U.S. 41 (1970). See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
258. In Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court cited Fornaris,but actually went further than
Fornarisin stating that it agreed with the district court that it was unnecessary to decide
whether it was the fifth or fourteenth amendment that applied. 416 U.S. at 668-69 n.5. The
Court cited Mejias for the proposition "there cannot exist under the American flag any governmental authority untrammeled by the requirements of due process of law as guaranteed by the
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A simple desire for doctrinal tidiness is enough to make one wish
the courts would decide which clause of the Constitution they are
applying in these cases. The loose analysis is especially disconcerting
when the Court actually strikes down a territorial law without saying
precisely which clause of the Constitution it offends.2 59 There are also
functional reasons for objecting to this ambivalence. First, if the
Court is not certain whether the fourteenth or the fifth amendment
applies, maybe it is questionable whether either of the two apply.
The uncertainty as to which is applicable suggests the possibility that
one or both could be inapplicable. The only answer the Court gives to
this is a quotation from the Joint Resolution of Congress to the effect
that no governmental authority can exist under the jurisdiction of
the United States untrammeled by the requirement of due process.26 0
The constitutional judgment of Congress, however, is not infallible.
In fact, the opinion of the district court in Mejias suggests a contrary possibility. The district court, it will be recalled, opined that
Puerto Rico was not bound directly by either the fifth or fourteenth
amendment to afford due process protections equivalent to those
guaranteed by the fifth amendment, but only by a promise in the
covenant which preceded commonwealth status.2 6 1 The district court
seemed to assume the result in any given case would be the same as if
the fifth amendment itself were applicable. If Puerto Rico in fact is
bound only by its promise in the covenant, however, it is unclear
whether Puerto Rico agreed to be bound by on-going interpretations
of the fifth amendment or only by the fifth amendment as it stood at
the time of the covenant. Suppose Puerto Rico agreed to guarantee
due process only in the "fundamental fairness" sense, an interpretation of due process that was still pre-eminent at the time the comConstitution of the United States." Id. at 668, n.5. In Flores de Otero, the Court cited CaleraToledo as authority for the either-or approach. 426 U.S. at 599-601. The Court also cited Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), for the proposition that an "egregious" violation of equal
protection offends the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 426 U.S. at 601. The Court
also cited "either-or" cases from the First Circuit. Id. at 601 n.32.
In Terrol Torres, the Court cited Calero-Toledo and Flores de Otero as authority for the
"either-or" approach. 442 U.S. at 469-71. The Court concluded "the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment" apply to Puerto Rico, but said "we have no occasion to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to Puerto Rico directly or by operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 4,12 U.S. at 471 (citing Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 601). In
Gautier Torres and Rosario, involving congressional legislation, it was clear it was the fifth
amendment that was potentially applicable.
259. E.g., Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); Terrol Torres v. Puerto
Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979)..
260. H.R.J. Res. 430, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 326 (1952).
261. See Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 319 (1953). See also supra notes 124-27 and
accompanying text.
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pact was concluded. 62 If this were true, the "fundamental fairness"
approach to due process is arguably all that binds Puerto Rico today.
The second practical problem with the either-or approach to the
Bill of Rights-fourteenth amendment issue is that it assumes in every
case that a derivative principle made applicable through due process
has a meaning identical to that of the clause from which it' came. In
the area of criminal due process, "selective incorporation"263 has
progressed to the point where the results in many cases are likely to
be identical whether a case arises directly under the Bill of Rights or
under the fourteenth amendment. Thus, in a search and seizure case,
such as Terrol Torres, resolving the either-or question may have little
practical significance. 2 " The Court has also been aided in its effort to

avoid the fifth-fourteenth problem in territorial cases by its own tendency in other areas to achieve a parity of constitutional treatment of
the state and federal governments. In a number of areas, the Court
has taken a constitutional principle explicitly applicable to only one
side of the federal equation and made it applicable to the other side.
The selective incorporation of the criminal procedure safeguards of
the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment is an obvious example, but the first amendment and the
taking clause of the fifth amendment were incorporated even ear262. The "fundamental fairness" interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is generally
traced from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). This interpretation conceded the Bill of
Rights to be a guide in determining due process "fundamental fairness," but maintained states
were not bound by the interpretations of those amendments applicable to the federal government. While that position largely has been discarded, it was a viable, perhaps predominant,
interpretation of due process at the time the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was created. Conceivably, it was the basis of the "promise" contemplated by the district judge in Mejias. If that
were true, the promise presumably did not change even though the Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause changed. Yet the flaw in the district judge's analysis was his
assumption that the Constitution was not directly applicable to Puerto Rico. See supra notes
120-28 and accompanying text.
263. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
264. For some years, a debate continued over whether the incorporation of a provision of
the Bill of Rights brought with it all of the federal case law interpreting that provision, or
whether states were still free in some respects to make their own applications of the incorporated right. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The "bag and baggage" position,
that the incorporated right is identical to the federal provision in all its details, has for the
most part prevailed. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Professor Kenneth Karst has examined the relationship between the equal protection
clause and the fifth amendment due process clause in some detail. See generally Karst, supra
note 132. Karst concluded that there was a "basic congruence" between fourteenth and fifth
amendment equal protection, but with exceptions where "overriding national interests" were
involved. Id. at 562. Karst believedthese exceptions could probably be placed into two categories: those respecting Federalism interests and those involving separation of powers interests.
Id. at 558, 560. Because the case which explicitly mentioned these categories was an immigration case, the exceptions could have significance for territories. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
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lier.260 There are also clauses which by their terms are applicable only
to the states, but have been made applicable in principle to the federal government through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Two of these, the equal protection and contract clauses, were
involved in the territorial cases of the seventies.
In Bolling v. Sharpe,26' however, the Court was careful to state
that due process and equal protection are not "always interchangeable phrases. 26 7 In recent cases, however, the Court has treated them
as such. Even so, federal and state interests may be conceived differently in applying the clauses. As the dissent noted in Flores de Otero,
the federal government traditionally has been perceived to have a
greater interest, and therefore more latitude, in dealing with aliens
than have the States. 6 s
In Gautier Torres, the Court dismissed Puerto Rico's argument
that it should have more authority to search incoming alien passengers because it's territorial boundaries were international to all except the United States and thus constituted an intermediate border.
The Court simply said that "Puerto Rico is not unique because it is
an island. ' 26 9 Hawaii is also made up of islands. Federal authority,
however, might be greater on an island. The Court simply assumed
that Puerto Rico was analogous to a state and that control of its international borders would be handled by a separate United States
agency. On the facts of Torres, the Court's holding may be correct.
Federal authorities do handle customs and immigration matters in
Puerto Rico as in the states. 7 0 Such is not the case, however, in all
territories. In American Samoa, for example, the American Samoa
government exercises jurisdiction over customs and immigration.2 7 '
Certainly, in the case of that territory the argument of intermediate
border would have to be given more serious consideration.
Immigration issues were also in the background in Flores de
Otero, where the Court struck down Puerto Rico's American citizenship requirement for engineering licenses. The majority gave short
265. Gitlow v. New York, 2613 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech and press); Chicago, B.
& Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1887) (just compensation required for taking); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1886) (taking must be for public use).
266. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
267. Id. at 499.
268. 426 U.S. at 608-09 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. at 100-01 ("[O]verriding national interests may provide a justification for a
citizenship requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement may not be
enforced by a State.").
269. 442 U.S. at 474.
270. Id. at 473.
271. 9 AM. SAMOA CODE § 201 (1973) (aliens and immigration); 12 AM. SAMOA CODE §§
1101-1183 (1973) (customs regulations and duties).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss4/4

56

Laughlin: The Burger Court and the United States Territories
1984]

U.S. TERRITORIES AND BURGER COURT

shrift to Puerto Rico's argument that it needed to control the influx
of Spanish-speaking aliens and raise prevailing living standards. Justice Blackmun saw the former as merely the expression of a desire to
discriminate and the latter as an impermissible way to achieve an
economic goal. The Court again raised the spectre of setting a bad
precedent for states and decided the case on the basis of earlier cases
involving state restrictions on alien employment. Only Justice Rehnbe the same under both
quist questioned whether the results would
272
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.

Certainly some of the territories see themselves as having special
immigration problems. American Samoa is a case in point. Overpopulation is acute. Its coastlines are easily accessible by private boat
from a country with similar cultpral, racial and linguistic backgrounds. False claims of citizenship are difficult to disprove because
birth records are incomplete. Samoa's immigration policies are very
restrictive and apply to non-Samoan American citizens as well as
aliens.273 Furthermore, the restrictions do not stop at the border. Samoa restricts employment of non-Samoans in all occupations to cases
where it is determined that no Samoan citizen is available to perform
the job.274 Of course, Samoa may be distinguishable from Puerto Rico
for the purposes of the fifth-fourteenth problem. The American Samoa government is, after all, a creation of the Department of Interior 275 and the case for arguing its action is federal rather than state
action for constitutional purposes may be stronger. 276

Terrol Torres and Flores de Otero could be read to suggest that
the Court treats territorial action as if it were state action rather
than federal action. One problem with that is the stronger textual
argument runs the other way.2 77 Also, in light of Gautier Torres and

Rosario, Puerto Rico might ask why, if it is to be treated as analogous to a state when it exercises its own authority, it is not accorded
equal treatment with states when its citizens challenge discrimina272. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
273. 9 AM. SAMOA CODE § 201(b) (1973) provides: "This act is to be interpreted and construed so as to effect its general purpose to limit entry into American Samoa to persons of
Samoan ancestry, their spouses and their children." In the case of the land ownership restrictions, the term "Samoan ancestry" has been given a literal interpretation so as to include Westem Samoans. This leads to the unusual result that some aliens can buy land in American Samoa that most United States citizens cannot. Moon v. Falemalama, 4 Am. Sam. 836 (1975).
274. 9 AM. SAMOA CODE § 208 (1979). 9 AM. SAMOA CODE § 371 (1979) provides that the
exclusion of non-American Samoans does not apply when such persons "offer a skill or expertise not readily available in the American Samoan community" and the skill or expertise is
needed in American Samoa.
275. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
276. Puerto Rico, however, can and does make all the arguments that Samoa uses to justify its immigration policy.
277. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
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tory federal legislation under the fifth amendment equal protection
clause.27
The federal-state action question should be resolved in favor of
federal action. This posiion is easier to reconcile with the text of the
Constitution. There is clearly a serious problem in reading the word
"state" to include territory because it certainly will not be read that
way consistently throughout the Constitution. Territories would not
279
be deemed entitled to elect United States Senators, for example.
Conversely, all power in the territories is derived from federal power
and there seems to be no analytical problem in finding that territorial
action is federal action, whether the territory is organized or unorganized. The only difference is that in an unorganized territory the
authority is delegated by the Executive and in an organized territory,
authority comes directly from Congress.
In fact the territorial laws might have fared better, and the territory given more autonomy, if the Court had characterized territorial
actions in these cases as federal actions. In Flores de Otero and Terrol Torres, where territorial laws were struck down, the laws related
to immigration, airport searches and restrictions on alien employment. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his Flores de Otero dissent, the federal government traditionally has the predominant interest in immigration matters. The results possibly would have been the
same. Arguably, neither statute was constitutionally justifiable even
if they were treated as deriving from the authority of the federal government. The territory, however, certainly was not aided by the fifthfourteenth ambivalence. There is no textual support for the idea that
territorial action is state action and the doctrine serves no useful purpose. It does not enhance territorial autonomy.28 0
278.
279.

State.

See supra notes 215-50 and accompanying text.
"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
... U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added). See Laughlin, supra note 12, at 341

n.19.

280. A defendant in a criminal case in American Samoa recently challenged that territory's failure to provide a grand jury. The defendant relied on King's specific holding that the
Constitution requires a petit jury in American Samoa. The defendant argued that providing a
grand jury would be no more impractical or anomalous than would providing a petit jury. The
grand jury requirement of the fifth amendment is one of the few procedural safeguards of the
Bill of Rights that has not been made applicable to the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884). The High Court held that enforcement of the grand jury clause in Samoa would not

be "anomolous to the culture and conditions prevailing in American Samoa." The Court ruled,
however, that a grand jury was not required in American Samoa because "United States sovereignty over its territories vests Congress with the powers of both a local and a national government and it can do for a territory whatever a state can do for itself or one of its political
subdivisions." American Samoa Gov't v. Simoa, 1 Am. Sam. 2d 91, 92 (1983) (citing Cincinnati
Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 208 (1937) and American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26

U.S. 511 (1828)). The High Court reasoned that because a state is not required to provide a
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B. The ConstitutionalSignificance of Commonwealth Status
There remains the problem of commonwealth status. The district
court in Mejias held that no part of the United States Constitution is
directly applicable in a commonwealth, but that constitutional principles apply only to the degree the commonwealth has agreed to
make them applicable. Accepting this rationale, one might conclude
commonwealth action is neither state nor federal action but the action of some other kind of entity. The Mejias analysis, however, is
dubious, especially in light of the fact Puerto Ricans are American
citizens.28 1 It seems doubtful the Constitution would allow Congress
to create an entity whose residents are American citizens by birth,
but which has more sovereignty than a state. If Congress could do so,
a commonwealth would be a sort of a super state and in violation of
the equal footing principle.2 82
The effort to elevate the concept of commonwealth to something
close to independent sovereignty may be motivated in part by questions, raised at the United Nations and elsewhere, concerning
whether Puerto Rico is truly self-governing. 283 These concerns are
valid, but the cure is misdirected. Any clouds on Puerto Rican selfgovernment stem not from the fact Puerto Rico is subject to the constitutional limitations as are the states of the Union. Rather, they
stem from the fact Puerto Rico is not represented in the federal legislature or the electoral college. The United Nations could hardly contend the American states are not self-governing simply because they
are subject to the United States Constitution and the superiority of
federal law as ultimately interpreted by the federal courts. No such
charge can be made because the people of the states have a direct
voice in the making of federal law. This voice impacts the creation of
federal courts and the selection of the federal judges through the
electorate's vote for President and Congress. There certainly should
be no need to make the territories more sovereign than the states in
order to answer international complaints about self-government.
VII. PRESCRIPTIONS

Both logic and public policy point to the conclusion that territorial action is federal action and is limited, if at all, by the provisions
of the Constitution applicable to federal action in the territorial setgrand jury, neither is a territory.
281. Puerto Ricans were made American citizens by the Jones Act of 1917. Jones Act, ch.
145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982)).
282. See supra notes 120-29.
283. See generally Report of the U.N. Commission on Non-Self Governing Territories

(1975).
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ting. The nature of the constitutional scheme supports the Court's
pronouncements that all governmental powers under United States
jurisidiction derive from and are limited by the Constitution.2 84 The
Constitution bespeaks of only two categories of powers, state and federal. Territorial governmental power is derivative of the territorial
clause and it seems likely that Congress has residual powers over all
territories, despite the district court's statement in Mejias that Congress has given its power over to Puerto Rico.2 "
As recently as 1980, the Supreme Court referred to the territorial
clause in justifying Congress' decision to give reduced AFDC benefits
in Puerto Rico.2 86 Of course, the respective roles of the Congress and
the territorial government would be relevant to ultimate constitutional judgments. The results in the Terrol Torres case, for example,
would likely be the same because customs and immigration matters
in Puerto Rico are handled by other agencies. Under these circumstances, hypothetical federal power over border control could not be
used to justify the actions of the Puerto Rico government any more
than, say, the Environmental Protection Agency could cite authority
entrusted to the Interstate Commerce Commission to justify EPA
regulations which in fact serve a different purpose.28 7
Once the source of power question is resolved, the Court should
adopt the King approach to resolve the underlying questions of constitutional application. With this approach, there is a presumption
that all parts of the Constitution are applicable in the territories.
That presumption, however, can be rebutted by convincing proof
that the application of a specific provision in a particular territory
284. This was the second major issue in Covert. Earlier cases suggested both the President and Congress had certain powers in foreign affairs that were extra-constitutional and
therefore not subject to the same limits as powers flowing from the Constitution. United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In
Covert, the government attempted to justify its denial of jury trials to civilians who accompanied the armed forces abroad. The government contended it was implementing "status of
forces" agreements with the host countries, and thus was exercising extra-constitutional power.
In rejecting that argument, Justice Black said: "The obvious and decisive answer to this, of
course, is that no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or any
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." 354 U.S. at
16.
285. "Congress had the plenary power to make all needful rules and regulations as to
Puerto Rico. It has exercised those powers by granting them away through a compact with the
people of Puerto Rico." Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 319 (1953).
286. "Congress, which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitution ...
to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the
United States,' may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational basis
for its actions." Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2).
287. See Laughlin, supra note 12, at 376-81.
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would be impractical or anomalous. ss
In this context, "impractical" refers to circumstances in the territory which would make the provision unworkable,28 9 while "anomalous" means the provision would have an effect in the territory that
would be seriously disruptive to the social or cultural system. 29 0 For
example, it was previously claimed that jury trials would not work in
American Samoa because of a purported unwillingness of Samoans to
convict their compatriots and also because of a fear that Samoan
matai would exercise undue influence over family members who
served on juries. 291 This was not proven, 292 but it was a claim of impracticability, that the culture would frustrate the constitutional
rule. It is currently claimed that application of the equal protection
principle to Samoa in a way that would strike down the protective
land laws and make the sale of land to non-Samoans permissible
would destroy the Samoan culture. This is a claim of anomality, that
the rule would harm the culture. The provision would work but
might work too well. The fear is that with free alienation the
Samoans would lose their land and with it their culture. 9 3
In either case, as the Court said in King, such a determination
must "rest on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural
development of [the territory]. That understanding cannot be based
on unsubstantiated opinion; it must be based on facts. '294 Those
facts should be developed scientifically and organized systematically.
They should be presented to the Court either as evidence at trial or
in a modern Brandeis Brief. Social and behaviorial scientists working
closely with the people of the territories and their lawyers could be of
immense benefit in assessing the probable impact of a particular constitutional interpretation on a territory. This data, of course, would
be critiqued and, where appropriate, disputed or rebutted by the
party arguing for application of the constitutional provision.29 5
Congressional action affecting territories should be subjected to
the same test as territorial action. Certainly there is no reason for
being any more deferential to congressional action. Deference is usually justified by the existence of political safeguards. Territorials are
288. See id. at 377.
289. See id. at 380-81.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 375.
292. Damon, The First Jury Trials in American Samoa, 5 SAMoAN PAC. L.J. 31 (1979),
indicates that the initial experience with juries in American Samoa was positive. The author's
interviews with Samoan judges and lawyers revealed that, at the end of 1982, there was a general consensus that the jury system worked as well in Samoa as anywhere else.
293. See Laughlin, supra note 12, at 385-87.
294. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
295. See Laughlin, supra note 12, at 386-87.
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represented in their own legislatures, but not in Congress. Thus, if
the Court did apply dual levels of scrutiny, it is congressional action
that should be subjected to the higher standard. Finally and perhaps
most importantly, the Constitution should be amended to give territorials representation in Congress. No degree of judicial protection
can take the place of franchise.
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